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CONSTITUTING CHILDREN’S
BODILY INTEGRITY
B. JESSIE HILL†
ABSTRACT
Children have a constitutional right to bodily integrity. Courts do
not hesitate to vindicate that right when children are abused by state
actors. Moreover, in at least some cases, a child’s right to bodily
integrity applies within the family, giving the child the right to avoid
unwanted physical intrusions regardless of the parents’ wishes.
Nonetheless, the scope of this right vis-à-vis the parents is unclear; the
extent to which it applies beyond the narrow context of abortion and
contraception has been almost entirely unexplored and untheorized.
This Article is the first in the legal literature to analyze the
constitutional right of minors to bodily integrity within the family by
spanning traditionally disparate doctrinal categories such as abortion
rights; corporal punishment; medical decisionmaking; and
nontherapeutic physical interventions such as tattooing, piercing, and
circumcision. However, the constitutional right of minors to bodily
integrity raises complex philosophical questions concerning the
proper relationship between family and state, as well as difficult
doctrinal and theoretical issues concerning the ever-murky idea of
state action. This Article canvasses those issues with the ultimate goal
of delineating a constitutional right of bodily security and autonomy
for children.
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The natural parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child
of its liberty by confining it in his own home . . . ; nor is the state,
when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for
the same purpose, required to adopt any process as a means of
placing its hands upon the child . . . .
1

– Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1905

INTRODUCTION
When Anna Fitzgerald, the thirteen-year-old heroine of the
popular novel My Sister’s Keeper, appears in an attorney’s office and
says she wants to sue her parents “for the rights to her own body,” the
2
attorney tries to give her the phone number for Planned Parenthood.
Anna is not seeking access to contraception or abortion, however—
she is hoping to avoid being forced by her mother to donate a kidney
3
to Anna’s sister, who is dying of leukemia.
The scene between Anna and her attorney highlights two
peculiar features of minors’ constitutional rights to bodily integrity.
First, those rights are largely understood, and most fully developed, in
the context of minors’ sexual and reproductive rights. Indeed, it may
seem odd even to speak of minors’ bodily integrity rights in any other
context. When the law regulates children’s bodies in other contexts, it
largely frames the issues in terms of family privacy, parental rights, or
4
perhaps children’s vaguely defined best interests.
Second, minors do possess a constitutional right to bodily
security and autonomy—in at least some contexts even against their
parents. The most widely recognized context for this constitutional
right is that of reproductive healthcare: some minors possess a right to
seek abortion and possibly contraception without involving their
5
parents. But, as this Article explains below, it is not clear precisely

1. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200, 201 (Pa. 1905) (holding constitutional
Pennsylvania’s act permitting delinquent and neglected children to be committed to a “[h]ouse
of [r]efuge”). The last words of the quoted sentence are “to lead it into one of its courts.” Id.
2. JODI PICOULT, MY SISTER’S KEEPER 20–23 (2004).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390, 391 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (discussing
sibling organ donation in relation to parents’ rights and minor’s rights, without specifying which
rights of the minor were involved); Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 431 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (considering parent’s legal “entitle[ment] to have a ‘bris’ [circumcision] performed for his
infant son”).
5. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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how or why the constitutional bodily integrity right can be limited to
this particular context. Indeed, courts routinely recognize a
constitutional bodily integrity right of children not to be abused by
6
state actors. This aspect of the bodily integrity right is not limited to
sexual and reproductive health-care services, but instead extends to
protect minors against all severe and unwanted state-imposed
physical intrusions.
Spanning traditional doctrinal categories, this Article aims to
examine and, ultimately, to provide structure for the amorphous
constitutional right of minors to bodily integrity. It is the first Article
in the legal literature to consider the landscape of regulation across
such diverse areas as corporal punishment, parents’ authority to grant
or withhold consent for children’s medical care, minors’ access to
abortion, and parental control over nonmedical interventions such as
tattooing and ear piercing, with the aim of identifying a constitutional
7
right that applies throughout. This Article also attempts to provide
some theoretical explanations for the law’s treatment of the subject of
children’s rights to bodily integrity independent of their parents. In
particular, it grapples with the inherent theoretical difficulties
attendant upon recognizing a meaningful constitutional right of
children to bodily integrity, including the problem of identifying state
6. See cases cited infra notes 18, 26–28.
7. Some scholarship from the 1970s onward addressed the nascent constitutional rights of
children, which found recognition beginning in the 1960s. For example, Professors Lee
Teitelbaum and James Ellis considered the due-process rights of children, but their work was
written before much of the doctrinal development discussed in this Article, and it focuses on the
due-process right to liberty generally, rather than vis-à-vis the parents. Lee E. Teitelbaum &
James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12
FAM. L.Q. 153, 170–74 (1978). Other articles have discussed the constitutional bodily integrity
rights of children in specific, limited contexts, such as growth attenuation, genital-normalization
surgery, or sibling organ donation. See generally Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Testing the
Boundaries of Family Privacy: The Special Case of Pediatric Sibling Transplants, 35 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1289, 1328 (2014); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Noblesse Oblige: States’ Obligations to
Minors Living with Life-Limiting Conditions, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 333 (2012); Ross Povenmire, Do
Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy
Tissue from Their Infant Children? The Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (1999); Mary Koll, Note, Growth, Interrupted: Nontherapeutic
Growth Attenuation, Parental Medical Decision Making, and the Profoundly Developmentally
Disabled Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 225; Anne Tamar-Mattis, Note,
Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 59 (2006). In addition, Professor Caitlin Borgmann has described and
critiqued the constitutional right against compelled bodily intrusions across multiple contexts,
including corporal punishment, but her analysis focuses primarily on adults, and only on the
right of individuals against the state. See generally Caitlin Borgmann, The Constitutionality of
Government-Imposed Bodily Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059.

HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

BODILY INTEGRITY

3/25/2015 12:23 PM

1299

action in the context of what often appears to be private
decisionmaking. Drawing on the theoretical work of the historian and
philosopher Michel Foucault, this Article argues that the
pervasiveness of state power, which operates even within the
otherwise-private family, deserves recognition in state-action
doctrine. This Article thus advocates for a more robust concept of
children’s bodily integrity that would be enforceable, at least in some
contexts, through a constitutional cause of action.
But why focus on the right to bodily integrity rather than any of
the countless other aspects of the parent-child relationship that the
law affects? Of course, children’s rights are affected by parental and
state control in numerous dimensions—not just with respect to their
bodies. To a large extent, moreover, the parent-child relationship,
and the role of the state within that relationship, is well-trodden
ground, covered extensively by political theorists, philosophers, and
8
legal scholars, among others. In part, this Article simply uses the
concept of bodily integrity as a new lens to examine that relationship,
thereby yielding some novel insights. At the same time, however,
there is much that is unique, and uniquely interesting, about the issue
of minors’ constitutional right to bodily integrity.
First, the problem of minors’ right to bodily integrity is one of
overlapping and potentially conflicting constitutional privacy rights:
that of the family as an entity, and that of the child as an autonomous
9
citizen who is entitled to the protection of the state. This facet of the
problem distinguishes it from many other aspects of the parent-childstate relationship, in which there is often no colorable right on the
10
part of the child to compete with parental rights and state interests.
8. See infra Part II.
9. Cf. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7, at 170–74 (noting that parental-rights cases such
as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) involved no conflict between parent and child, and that
cases involving parent-child conflict present the problem of children’s liberty interests more
directly).
10. For example, when parents make decisions about their children’s education, the
children’s constitutional rights are not usually involved. Some laws may impact children’s rights
to free speech or the free exercise of religion, see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165
(1944) (implicating both), but it is not clear to what extent children possess such rights
independently of their parents. Certainly, children’s free-speech rights are more limited than
adults’ when they are acting independently in the school context or in the marketplace, see, e.g.,
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–37
(1968); but see Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (holding that minors
have a right to access violent video games even if their parents do not approve), but few, if any,
cases clearly address minors’ First Amendment right to resist parental mandates. Similarly,
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Indeed, though the minors’ right to bodily integrity is often, albeit
11
obliquely, referenced by courts and commentators alike, it exists
uncomfortably at the intersection of two unreconciled and potentially
irreconcilable lines of doctrine: the line that recognizes minors’
constitutional privacy rights, exemplified by Planned Parenthood v.
12
13
Danforth and Bellotti v. Baird, and the line that recognizes parents’
right to make important decisions for their children, exemplified by
14
15
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
Moreover, identifying children’s right to bodily integrity raises
particularly difficult but relatively unexamined questions about when
state intervention in the family is justified. It is often taken for
granted—by courts, by liberal philosophers, and by more conservative
or parentalist thinkers—that the state’s power to intervene in the
family at least exists to prevent abuse, neglect, or similar harm to the
16
child. Yet, this apparently agreed-upon limit begs a deeper question
regarding the meaning of “abuse” and the state’s authority to define
and delimit that term. This Article problematizes some previously
unquestioned assumptions about the propriety of state intervention in
parental control over children’s bodies.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the existing
right of minors to bodily integrity. Drawing on the example of
abortion, it queries whether the right of minors to bodily security and
autonomy, even in the face of parental disagreement, can be extended
beyond that seemingly sui generis context, and if so, what the scope of
such a right might be. Proceeding from this background, Part II
discusses the two predominant philosophical views of the family and
its relationship to the state, both of which uncomfortably coexist in
constitutional case law pertaining to children’s and parents’ rights.
Part III then demonstrates how conflicting views of the family create
two significant difficulties in identifying and enforcing children’s right

children have a right to equal protection of the laws, which may be involved when the state
permits or obstructs certain parental choices, but those rights again are generally treated as
derivative, rather than independent, of the parents’ rights. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 487 (1954).
11. Povenmire, supra note 7, at 100, 104–07; Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV.
1107, 1139–42 (2012); Koll, supra note 7, at 235–42; Tamar-Mattis, supra note 7, at 88, 99–100.
12. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
13. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
14. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
15. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
16. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168–70 (1944); infra Part II.
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to bodily integrity within the family. First is the doctrinal problem of
identifying state action in the context of minors’ rights. Often,
conflicts around minors’ right to bodily integrity involve no apparent
state actor, but state-mandated and state-enforced duties, immunities,
and privileges permeate the parent-child relationship. The second
difficulty is a conceptual one. The more expansive the judicial
understanding of children’s right to bodily integrity, the more the
state is invited to intervene into both minors’ and parents’
decisionmaking. These two problems, which appear to be
conceptually and doctrinally distinct, are in fact closely related to one
another. Both are consequences of the diffuse nature of state power,
which, according to Foucault, permeates even the most seemingly
intimate relationships and simultaneously “governmentalizes” those
17
private spheres.
Finally, Part IV envisions a meaningful, but meaningfully
delimited, right to bodily integrity for children within the family. It
argues that a broadened understanding of state action in the parentchild decisionmaking context may provide a partial way forward
toward vindicating a real but not overly expansive constitutional right
of children to bodily integrity. In particular, a constitutional bodily
integrity right should be recognized and applied whenever a minor
validly invokes the jurisdiction of a court on her behalf. This means
that minors should be able to vindicate bodily integrity rights against
state actors in suits that are otherwise properly brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This also means that minors are entitled to have courts,
as state actors, take their constitutional rights into account when
adjudicating disputes between private parties such as parents and
hospitals. In terms of substantive standards, although parents should
continue to be afforded discretion in decisionmaking for immature
minors, courts should enforce younger minors’ right to protection of
their best interests and older, mature minors’ right to autonomy in
decisionmaking.
I. THE EXISTING RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
Children possess a constitutional right to bodily integrity, defined
as a right against harmful or unwanted physical intrusions mandated
or caused by government action, together with a right to seek desired

17. As explained infra Part III.B, these terms and the theory behind them are imported
from the work of the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault.

HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1302

3/25/2015 12:23 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1295

18

medical treatments or interventions. Moreover, this right applies
even against the minor’s parents in some cases. This Part endeavors
to unpack this right, first by demonstrating its applicability when state
actors are involved, and second by considering when and how the
right is understood to apply to ostensibly private disputes. Minors’
constitutional right to bodily integrity may be at issue in disputes
between private parties when a minor attempts to engage in a
constitutionally protected activity that the minor’s parents disapprove
of, or when the minor seeks immunity from harm imposed by his
parents. This Part also considers the limits of this right, which has
been only partially constitutionalized.
A. The Right to Bodily Integrity Against the State
The proposition that children have rights against unwanted
bodily intrusions imposed upon them by the state is relatively
19
uncontroversial. In Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court
20
acknowledged minors’ liberty interest in “personal security.”
Ingraham dealt with allegations that corporal punishments
administered by school officials pursuant to Florida law were so
severe and painful—including causing a hematoma in one student and
“depriving [another student] of the full use of his arm for a week”—
21
that they violated the students’ right to due process. The Ingraham
Court held that the minors had a procedural due-process right, but it
also held that the only process due was the availability of a
22
postdeprivation remedy. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that
the right was limited by the scope of the traditional common-law
acceptance of corporal punishment and the school’s interest in
23
discipline. Nonetheless, in the process of analyzing the due-process

18. See, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1063 (6th Cir. 1998). The term
“bodily integrity” may not seem like a good fit for some of the situations discussed below, such
as when minors seek interventions like cosmetic surgery or tattooing, which the parents resist.
Those situations seem to invoke a form of bodily control but not necessarily “integrity,” or
wholeness, per se. “Bodily integrity” is nonetheless used throughout this Article because it is the
term that is used in constitutional doctrine, which broadly encompasses a right to autonomy
with respect to bodily interventions. Cf. Borgmann, supra note 7, at 1063 (identifying the right
to bodily integrity as including both a “right to repel bodily intrusions” and a “right to
affirmative decision making about one’s body”).
19. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
20. Id. at 652.
21. Id. at 657.
22. Id. at 683.
23. Id. at 676.

HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

BODILY INTEGRITY

3/25/2015 12:23 PM

1303

claims, the Court also recognized that the right to freedom from
unreasonable bodily restraint and punishment was a fundamental
24
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This right
may therefore provide the basis for a substantive due-process claim,
as well as a procedural due-process claim, if either is infringed
25
without sufficient justification.
Drawing on Ingraham, numerous cases have recognized that
children’s bodily integrity right is violated when children are
mistreated by a state actor—usually in the context of a school or
juvenile-detention center. For example, some cases vindicate minors’
26
rights against excessive corporal punishment by school officials.
Those cases rely on the Supreme Court’s holding that students have a
“constitutionally protected liberty interest” in avoiding arbitrary or
27
excessive corporal punishment. Similarly, the bodily integrity right is
invoked to support the claim that children have a constitutional
substantive due-process right not to be physically or sexually abused
28
by a state actor. Thus, the bodily integrity right has been asserted
extensively in the school and juvenile-detention contexts.

24. Id. at 673–74 (noting that this right is one of the “privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (quotation marks omitted))). The Supreme Court subsequently
described Ingraham as establishing that “arbitrary corporal punishment represents an invasion
of personal security to which . . . parents do not consent when entrusting the educational
mission to the State.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
25. See Borgmann, supra note 7, at 1104 (noting that lower courts have read Ingraham to
imply the existence of a substantive due-process right against corporal punishment by state
actors in some circumstances).
26. E.g., P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that children have a
constitutional right against excessive physical punishment and assault by a public-school
teacher); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a principal’s
physical assault on a student implicated the student’s substantive due-process rights); Jefferson
v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a teacher who tied a
second grader to a chair for almost two days at school was not entitled to qualified immunity for
violating the child’s right to bodily integrity).
27. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674.
28. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 1999) (observing
that “[a] number of circuit courts have found due process violations when state actors have
inflicted sexual abuse on individuals” (alteration in original) (quoting Rogers v. City of Little
Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 1998)) (quotation marks omitted)); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. #40,
130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Ingraham for the proposition that students have a
constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity, and holding that the right was violated when
a public-school janitor sexually abused a child); Doe v. Rains Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d
1402, 1407 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that, although it “is fairly debatable as an original
proposition,” precedent clearly establishes that sexual abuse of a minor by a state actor
constitutes a violation of the minor’s right to constitutional bodily integrity).
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On occasion, courts have upheld minors’ bodily integrity claims
29
outside the institutional context. For example, in In re L., a trial
court asserted that a sixteen-year-old minor had a right to “free[dom]
from unwanted infringements of bodily integrity” that weighed
30
against her putative father’s request that she undergo a blood test.
Because the father had sought a court order requiring the test to
establish his legal paternity, the court took into account the minor’s
31
right to bodily integrity against the state. Relatedly, in the case of In
32
re E.G., a state supreme court alluded to the possibility that minors
33
have bodily integrity rights with respect to end-of-life care. In that
case, the court considered whether a mature seventeen-year-old
minor had the right to refuse lifesaving blood transfusions for
34
leukemia. Although the minor’s mother agreed with her decision,
the state filed a petition to have the minor declared medically
35
neglected so that the treatment could be compelled. The court
ultimately upheld the minor’s decision on the ground that she was
“mature” and therefore permitted to refuse treatment under state
36
common law. However, the court also suggested, without deciding,
that the minor might have a constitutional privacy right to refuse
37
treatment. Thus, though the scope of the right is unclear, there is
little doubt that minors do possess a constitutional right to bodily
security and protection against unwanted bodily intrusions that are
imposed or mandated by state actors.
B. The Right to Bodily Integrity Against the Parents and the State
Courts have partially but inconsistently recognized children’s
right to bodily integrity. In the reproductive-health context, children
appear to have the most expansive power, grounded in the
Constitution, to make decisions about their bodies. Outside that

29. In re L., 632 A.2d 59 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993).
30. Id. at 61.
31. Id.
32. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
33. Id. at 326.
34. Id. at 324.
35. Id. at 323.
36. Id. at 326.
37. Id. The mature minor’s right to refuse potentially lifesaving medical treatment is also
raised by the novel My Sister’s Keeper. Spoiler alert: It turns out that the protagonist, Anna, is
attempting to refuse the kidney donation to respect her terminally ill sister’s desire to die
without further invasive treatment. PICOULT, supra note 2, at 448.
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context, however, a patchwork of state statutory and common law
governs. As detailed below, parents are generally presumed by state
law to be empowered to consent to bodily interventions on behalf of
their children. Rarely has it been suggested that children’s
constitutional right to bodily integrity is implicated when state law
delegates decisionmaking authority over children’s bodies to the
parents.
1. Abortion and Contraception. Minors’ right to bodily integrity
is uniquely salient in one area of constitutional jurisprudence—
reproductive rights. In that area, the right may be understood as a
constitutional right not just against the state, but also against the
minor’s own parents. The permissible extent and manner of a state’s
regulation of minors’ reproductive health-care decisions has been the
subject of relatively in-depth consideration by the Supreme Court,
and the federal courts have promulgated a well-developed body of
doctrine describing minors’ rights to access contraception and
abortion, regardless of their parents’ wishes. In theory at least, this
area represents the most expansive legal recognition for minors’
constitutional liberty rights against their parents. It is not clear,
however, whether this right extends beyond the abortion context.
Although courts appear only to accept a bodily integrity right for
minors within the family in that narrow set of cases, there is no clear
rationale for limiting the right in this way.
A constitutional right to bodily integrity for minors was first
38
recognized in the abortion context in the 1970s. Soon after Roe v.
39
Wade was decided, states began passing laws requiring parental
40
consent for minors seeking abortions. The Supreme Court, however,
41
did not lose much time in striking these laws down. In Danforth, the
Court held that “the State does not have the constitutional authority
to give a third party,” including the minor’s parent, “an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
38. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 53 (1976).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Eve W. Paul, Harriet F. Pilpel & Nancy F. Wechsler, Pregnancy, Teenagers
and the Law, 1976, 8 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 16, 19 (1976) (noting that thirteen parentalconsent requirements for abortion had been passed as of 1974, and that seven more were passed
between 1974 and 1976).
41. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 440–41 (1983),
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Danforth, 428 U.S. at
74; Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901, 901 (1976) (mem.); Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901, 901
(1976) (mem.).
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patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason
42
for withholding the consent.” At the same time, the Court
emphasized that its opinion was not intended to imply an absolute
right, possessed by all minors in all circumstances, to consent on their
43
own to the procedure. Instead, the Court appeared to welcome a
more refined legal structure for parental involvement in minors’
44
abortion decisions.
The Court had the opportunity to consider a more nuanced
legislative scheme in adjudicating the constitutionality of
45
Massachusetts’ parental-consent law. The Court outlined the
requirements for a constitutional parental-consent law for abortion in
46
Bellotti v. Baird. The governing rule since Bellotti essentially has
been that states may not require parental consent for minors seeking
abortions unless they also provide a mechanism called a “judicial
bypass,” by which the minor can seek judicial permission to obtain an
abortion on her own upon a showing either that she is mature and
well-informed enough to consent to the procedure, or that the
47
abortion would be in her best interests. Whether parents disagree
with the minor’s decision or not, she thus appears to have a
constitutional right to seek an abortion without their approval.
Although Bellotti’s rule applies only against the state in the sense that
it constrains the scope of parental-involvement laws, the right to
choose an abortion, in a sense, also takes the form of a right against
both the state and the parents. That is to say, it limits the
circumstances, the extent, and the reasons for which the minor may
be prevented from having an abortion by either her parents or the
48
state.
42. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
43. Id. at 75 (“We emphasize that our holding . . . does not suggest that every minor,
regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.”).
44. Id.
45. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 625–26 (1979) (plurality opinion); Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U.S. 132, 135–36 (1976).
46. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44.
47. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 427 (1990). Although Bellotti was a plurality
opinion, it has been treated by the Supreme Court and lower courts as delineating the relevant
constitutional rule. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992)
(citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622).
48. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 627. In addition, the district court had considered whether the
parents had “independent rights” in the minor’s abortion decision that had to be protected by
the court. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 856 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. at 134. On
appeal, the Supreme Court noted this argument but declined to analyze it, speaking primarily of
the parents’ “role” rather than of their rights. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 627, 637–39.
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The Supreme Court has also recognized minors’ right to make
decisions affecting their own bodies with respect to access to
49
contraception. In Carey v. Population Services International, decided
after Danforth and during the Bellotti litigation, the Supreme Court
struck down by a 7–2 vote a state law prohibiting, among other things,
50
the distribution of contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen.
The right recognized in Carey is strikingly nebulous, however.
Although a four-Justice plurality in Carey rested its decision on a
robust understanding of minors’ constitutional privacy rights as
virtually equivalent to adults’, the concurring opinions, which
provided the votes the majority needed to strike down the
prohibition, were considerably more circumspect. Justice Brennan’s
plurality opinion, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun,
declared that the state may not, consistent with the Constitution,
“burden the right [of minors] to decide whether to bear children”
without a medical basis for the regulation, nor “delegate[] the State’s
authority to disapprove of minors’ sexual behavior to physicians, who
51
may exercise it arbitrarily.” Justices White and Stevens both
concurred in the result primarily on the ground that there was a poor
means–end fit between the state’s goal of deterring sexual activity and
52
its ban on contraceptives for minors. At the same time, both
emphasized that no right of minors to engage in sexual activity could
53
be derived from the Court’s holding. Justice Powell, who also
concurred, was merely concerned about the infringement on the
rights of married minors under the age of sixteen and on the rights of
54
parents who wished to provide contraceptives to their children.
As this analysis of Carey suggests, a majority of the Court has not
clearly held that minors have a right to access contraception when
their parents disapprove. Indeed, that issue was not raised by the New
York law at issue in Carey, which forbade those under sixteen from
55
accessing contraception with or without parental consent.

49. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
50. Id. at 694.
51. Id. at 697–99.
52. Id. at 702–03 (White, J., concurring); id. at 714–16 (Stevens, J., concurring) (using the
amusingly apt metaphor that “[i]t is as though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of
motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets”).
53. Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 707–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 681. Nonetheless, twenty-one states explicitly permit all minors to consent on
their own to contraceptive services. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MINORS’
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Nonetheless, both courts and commentators have inferred such a
56
right, which may seem to be a logical corollary of the abortion right.
2. Beyond Minors’ Reproductive Rights? In most other areas
where minors’ bodily integrity right may be implicated, regulation
occurs through several common-law and statutory doctrines that
rarely refer to one another or to the constitutional privacy right. As in
the case of abortion and contraception, parents may—with the
support of state law—authorize or withhold authority for various
57
medical and nonmedical interventions for their minor children.
Corporal
punishment,
medical-treatment
decisions,
and
nontherapeutic interventions like tattooing and piercing are generally
regulated by state law, which presumes parents have broad
58
decisionmaking authority in most cases. Strikingly, constitutional
claims are rarely raised or addressed in cases challenging the
appropriateness of these bodily intrusions. Rather, common-law
standards govern, and little or no mention is made of substantive due
process or the right to bodily integrity.

ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES (2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_MACS.pdf. In some states, minors are allowed to access contraceptives
for health reasons, and in several others, only married minors can access contraception without
parental consent. Id. The states allowing minors to access contraception for health reasons are
Florida, Illinois, and Maine. FLA. STAT. § 381.0051 (2012); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 § 1 (2012);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1908 (2004). Those states also allow minors who are married or are
themselves parents to consent on their own to contraception. Id. A few states have no explicit
law on the topic. GUTTMACHER INST., supra.
56. See, e.g., Arneth v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 450, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Planned Parenthood
Ass’n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1007–09 (D. Utah 1983); Brenda D. Hofman,
Note, The Squeal Rule: Statutory Resolution and Constitutional Implications—Burdening the
Minor’s Right of Privacy, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1325, 1341–42.
57. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (2013). Several statutes delegate authority to
parents by negative implication, stating simply that minors are incompetent to provide consent
for their own care in most circumstances. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-102
(LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2014); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10101 (West 2012) (specifying that
an individual must be over eighteen to give consent to medical treatment).
58. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3721 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31 (2012 &
Supp. 2013). Other than tattooing and piercing, most elective, nontherapeutic interventions are
not specifically mentioned in state statutory law. The widespread assumption of most
commentators has been that parents have wide discretion to consent or withhold consent to
such interventions, as with similar medical interventions. See, e.g., JULIE A. GREENBERG,
INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 32 (2012); Susan Gilbert, Children’s
Bodies, Parents’ Choices, 39 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 14 (2009); Alicia Ouellette, Body
Modification and Adolescent Decision Making: Proceed with Caution, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 129, 136 (2012).
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For example, all fifty states have statutes purporting to
distinguish permissible corporal punishment from abuse. Nearly all of
those statutes use amorphous terms such as “reasonable,”
“appropriate,” and “moderate” to characterize legitimate physical
59
punishment and to distinguish it from abuse. These vague standards
are then given meaning through the common law. Thus, children’s
constitutional rights are also almost entirely ignored in the familydiscipline context, despite the fact that they crop up quite often in the
institutional context. Within the family, unlike in the institutional
context, the general understanding seems to be that children are
without constitutional rights to avoid physical harm, except those
conferred by statute or common law. Indeed, the Supreme Court
famously held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
60
Social Services that the Due Process Clause did not provide a cause
of action to a child who was severely beaten by his father, even
though social workers had been alerted to past abuse of the child and
61
declined to remove him from the home.
In the medical-treatment context outside abortion and
contraception, minors have long been subject to a common-law
presumption that they are incapable of consenting on their own to
healthcare and that parents are capable of providing informed
62
consent on their behalf. There are a few circumstances in which
those presumptions do not apply, but these circumstances arise from
common-law and statutory entitlements, and do not appear to have

59. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (LexisNexis 2005) (“reasonable and appropriate
physical force”); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-15 (LexisNexis 2013) (“reasonable corporal
punishment”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (2006) (“force used is reasonable in manner and
moderate in degree”). Statutes may privilege corporal punishment against criminal prosecution,
civil actions, or both. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2011) (immunity from criminal
punishment); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-804 (LexisNexis 2013) (“Corporal punishment which
would, but for this part, be considered to be reasonable discipline of a minor . . . may not be
used as a basis for any civil or criminal action.”).
60. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
61. Id. at 191. However, the parents’ constitutional rights may be involved in courts’
findings that parents have the right to punish their children within reasonable limits, to make
medical decisions for them, and so forth. See, e.g., Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1389–92
(9th Cir. 1997) (considering the possibility that parents have a constitutional right to engage in
reasonable corporal punishment, but ultimately rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the right
is clearly established).
62. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 15
HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1266–67 (2000).
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63

constitutional foundations. For example, a number of states have
adopted “mature-minor” laws, which allow minors deemed
sufficiently mature to consent to medical treatment without parental
64
involvement. Much like those minors seeking a judicial bypass,
mature minors in the healthcare context must be able to “appreciat[e]
the nature, extent and probable consequences of the conduct
65
consented to” and to “weigh the risks and benefits.” Likewise, all
states have adopted statutes allowing at least some minors to consent
on their own to some forms of healthcare—most commonly,
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, outpatient substanceabuse and mental-health counseling, prenatal care, and treatment for
66
sexual assault. Most likely, these exceptions reflect the fact that
legislatures are concerned about the potential deterrent effects on the
minor if parental consent were required, as well as the public-health
implications (such as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases) that
67
might result.
Nonetheless, in the vast majority of cases, parents are
empowered to consent to medical care on behalf of their children,
limited only in extreme situations by neglect or abuse laws that may
prevent them from denying necessary care or perhaps from imposing
68
unnecessary treatments. It is thus fair to say that parents routinely
make decisions about medical care for their children that are

63. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-107 (2013); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739,
745 (Tenn. 1987). Elsewhere, I have questioned whether it is truly meaningful to speak of
minors’ incapacity to consent and parents’ capacity to consent for them as constituting default
rules or background presumptions against which states must legislate. B. Jessie Hill, Medical
Decision-Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 38 (2012). Nonetheless, I concede that they are accurate premises in the
vast majority of cases. Id. at 50.
64. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (LexisNexis 2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/3-2 (2012);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-3 (LexisNexis 2011).
65. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 746 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt.
b (1977), and W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, 115 (5th ed. 1984)). Relatedly, minors may
be considered “emancipated” for the purposes of medical and other decisionmaking if they
exhibit indicia of independence, such as living on their own, serving in the military, or marrying.
See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 5.2.3 (3d ed. Supp.
2005).
66. HEATHER BOONSTRA & ELIZABETH NASH, MINORS AND THE RIGHT TO CONSENT TO
HEALTH CARE, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 4 (2000).
67. See, e.g., Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions
Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 323–24.
68. Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955,
966–67 (2010).
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medically indicated but not, strictly speaking, medically necessary or
69
life-saving. Parents can choose among reasonable medical options
with respect to antibiotics, tonsillectomies, and other such
70
interventions for relatively minor ailments.
Activities such as body piercing, tattooing, cosmetic surgeries,
circumcision, and other nontherapeutic interventions are similarly
regulated by state law, but there is a dearth of case law indicating the
71
constitutional limits of parental authority in this domain. The
underlying assumption appears to be that parents have the legal right
not only to choose among reasonable therapeutic alternatives, but
also to authorize some nontherapeutic interventions. Thus, for
example, commentators have noted the increasing prevalence of
plastic surgeries performed on teens, presumably authorized by their
72
parents in all cases. In most states, tattooing and piercing of minors
are permitted when the parent agrees, but tattooing of minors is
73
prohibited entirely in some states regardless of consent. A small
number of states explicitly exclude ear piercing from their general
body-piercing prohibitions, and two states specify that it is acceptable
for a parent to permit tattooing of a minor only to cover up an
74
existing tattoo. Texas law specifies that the consenting parent or
guardian must “consider[] [it to] be in the best interest of the [minor]
75
to cover” a particular tattoo.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Alicia Ouellette, Eyes Wide Open: Surgery to Westernize the Eyes of an Asian
Child, 39 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15, 16 (2009). In the 2000s, there have been widely publicized
attempts to outlaw circumcision. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Efforts to Ban Circumcision Gain
Traction in California, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at A20.
72. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 14 (stating that 205,119 teenagers under eighteen had
cosmetic procedures in 2007 and observing that ultimately, the decision depended on parents’
consent or financial support); Ouellette, supra note 58, at 129–30 (noting that almost 219,000
cosmetic surgeries were performed on teens in 2010, along with approximately 12,000 Botox
injections); id. at 136 (noting that parents generally have decisionmaking authority regarding
cosmetic body modification in the medical context).
73. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TATTOOS AND BODY PIERCINGS FOR
MINORS (2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/tattooing-and-bodypiercing.aspx.
74. See id. (Tennessee and Texas). These provisions appear to be motivated largely by a
concern for minors who bear gang-related tattoos. Cf. In re Antonio C., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 218,
221–22 (Ct. App. 2000) (imposing a probation requirement on a juvenile of no further
tattooing).
75. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 146.012(a-1)(1)(D) (West 2010).
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An exception to the model of broad parental discretion exists
only in those cases in which there is a strong likelihood of the parent
confronting a conflict of interests—for example, when a parent seeks
to permit a child to donate an organ or tissue to a sibling. In such
cases, common-law rules appear to dictate that a court order is
required for the sibling organ donation, and that the donation may
76
proceed only if it is in the best interests of the donating minor.
Again, however, the standard adopted is explicitly grounded in the
77
common law, without reference to constitutional rights.
Scholarly commentators have sometimes suggested that
children’s constitutional right to bodily integrity may be violated
when parents authorize, and physicians perform, invasive surgeries on
78
children that have little or no therapeutic benefit for the child. For
example, a controversial surgery sometimes performed on infants and
toddlers is “normalization” surgery for children born with ambiguous
79
genitalia—neither clearly male nor clearly female. This procedure,
which often has no medical benefit, is permanent, highly invasive, and
80
usually painful. Moreover, it often has long-term negative
76. Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1326 (Ill. 1990); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Gault’s
Legacy: Dignity, Due Process, and Adolescents’ Liberty Interests in Living Donation, 22 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 67, 76 (2008); Rachel M. Dufault, Comment, Bone Marrow
Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal Framework in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 211, 220 (1991). Parents must also seek a court order for sterilization of a mentally
incompetent child, whether minor or adult. Koll, supra note 7, at 246.
77. But see Hartman, supra note 76, at 86 (suggesting that medical decisionmaking by
minors implicates constitutional due-process concerns).
78. Koll, supra note 7, at 254–61; Tamar-Mattis, supra note 7, at 91–93. Some cases have
also recognized minor’s “liberty interest” in not being confined for medical treatment without
due process. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 597 (1979); In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1214
(Pa. 2010).
79. For an overview of medical treatment of intersex children, see generally GREENBERG,
supra note 58; KATRINA KARKAZIS, FIXING SEX: INTERSEX, MEDICAL AUTHORITY, AND
LIVED EXPERIENCE (2008).
80. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and
the Selective Condemnation of “Cultural Practices”, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 105–14
(2005) (detailing the harmful physical and psychological effects of normalization surgeries);
Karen Gurney, Sex and the Surgeon’s Knife: The Family Court’s Dilemma . . . Informed Consent
and the Specter of Iatrogenic Harm to Children with Intersex Characteristics, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
625, 631–35 (2007). Though once widely accepted, normalization surgery has garnered
significant opposition and advocates have worked to change the standard of care for infants with
disorders of sexual development. GREENBERG, supra note 58, at 24–25. Nonetheless, the
general assumption, in the absence of any relevant case law, appears to be that it is within
parents’ discretion to choose surgery, even when not medically necessary. For example, the
American Academy of Pediatrics consensus statement notes that parents “now seem to be less
inclined to choose surgery for” certain less severe intersex conditions, implying that they
nonetheless have the authority to do so. Peter A. Lee, Christopher P. Houk, S. Faisal Ahmed &
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81

consequences for the affected individual. Legal scholars have argued
that allowing such surgeries violates the infant’s right to bodily
82
integrity. And a lawsuit brought in 2013 on behalf of a child who was
subjected to the surgery while in foster care alleged both substantive
and procedural due-process violations of the child’s bodily integrity
83
right. This, however, remains one of the rare cases in which
constitutional—rather than common-law and statutory—standards
were invoked.
Surprisingly, with the exception of reproductive healthcare,
constitutional rights and entitlements have not permeated the law of
therapeutic and nontherapeutic medical interventions on minors to
any significant extent. If children possess a constitutional right to
bodily integrity, it should be implicated in all of these disparate
contexts—not limited to reproductive healthcare. Yet, cases involving
corporal punishment seldom, if ever, make reference to minors’ rights
in the healthcare context; similarly, cases dealing with minors’ rights
to make autonomous health-care decisions rarely look to the abortion
84
and contraception precedents.
Nor do cases dealing with

Ieuan A. Hughes, Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS
e488, e489 (2006), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/118/2/e488.full
.pdf+html (emphasis added); see also GREENBERG, supra note 58, at 32 (“Currently, parents can
consent to these surgeries and they are not subject to an external oversight or approval.”).
81. Gurney, supra note 80, at 631–35.
82. See, e.g., Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental
Rights for the Intersexed, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 31, 43–50 (2005); Tamar-Mattis, supra
note 7, at 90–93; Ryan L. White, Note, Preferred Private Parts: Importing Intersex Autonomy for
M.C. v. Aaronson, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 777, 821 (2014). The Cardozo Journal of Law and
Gender has published a symposium on intersex and the law. Symposium, Intersex Education,
Advocacy, & The Law, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1 (2005).
83. Complaint at 4, M.C. v. Aaronson, No. 2:13-cv-01303-DCN (D.S.C. May 14, 2013). The
district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, but
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on January 26, 2015. M.C. ex rel. Crawford v.
Amrhein, No. 13-2178, 2015 WL 310523, at *2, *5 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 2015). Without deciding
whether the surgery violated the infant’s constitutional right to bodily integrity, the Fourth
Circuit held that the law on this issue was not clearly established at the time the surgery took
place, in 2006. Id. at *4. The defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
84. But see In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1989) (citing Supreme Court precedent
regarding minors’ reproductive rights, in dicta, to show “that no ‘bright line’ age restriction of 18
is tenable in restricting the rights of mature minors, whether the rights be based on
constitutional or other grounds”); see also Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7 (examining minors’
ability to assert liberty rights, against the wishes of their parents, in a variety of contexts).
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circumcision address minors’ right to bodily integrity, though parents’
85
constitutional rights are sometimes invoked.
Although it may be defensible to view the minor abortion cases
86
as simply sui generis, it is not entirely clear how or why such
doctrinal isolation can be justified. One might argue that pregnant
minors are in a unique situation in that they are facing a decision with
profound long-term effects on the minor’s future—a decision that
cannot, moreover, be delayed until the minor reaches maturity.
However, many minors—such as those suffering from terminal
cancer, drug addiction, or sexually transmitted diseases—are virtually
indistinguishable from pregnant minors in terms of the gravity of their
situations and the need for immediate treatment. Moreover, as the
87
joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey emphasized: “Roe . . .
may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a
rule . . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal
affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to
88
mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection.” This language
suggests that the constitutional bodily integrity right is not limited to
the right to choose abortion; courts’ failure to acknowledge the
Constitution’s application beyond this domain is thus puzzling.
Additionally, the common-law and constitutional frameworks
regarding medical treatment use overlapping standards such as
maturity and best interests. It is therefore particularly surprising that
the constitutional bodily integrity right recognized in the minor
abortion cases has not permeated the medical decisionmaking
context. As a result, unresolved conflicts remain. For example, it is
uncertain how the mature-minor doctrine fits with statutory
provisions requiring parental consent for minors seeking abortions.
On one hand, a statutory requirement of parental consent would
seem to constitute an explicit derogation of the common-law doctrine,
rendering the mature-minor rule a nullity in the abortion context. On
the other hand, the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence
reincorporates that standard in holding that mature minors have a

85. Cf. Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 431 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that a
religious circumcision ritual should be performed on a newborn at the parent’s request to
respect the parent’s religious rights).
86. See, e.g., Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 61
(1999).
87. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
88. Id. at 857.
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constitutional right to seek abortions without parental consent—
89
obviously (if not explicitly) referencing the common-law doctrine.
Thus, the right of children to bodily integrity is only partially
constitutionalized. It has been recognized in some contexts, such as
abuse by state actors and access to abortion. In other contexts—such
as corporal punishment by parents, medical treatment, and
nontherapeutic interventions—it has largely been ignored, even
though the right would appear to be equally relevant. The reason for
this disconnect may appear obvious at first glance: when a parent,
unlike a public-school teacher or public detention-facility officer,
denies a child’s right to bodily integrity, there is no state action, and
therefore constitutional protections are not implicated. The
Constitution thus protects children in public institutions but not in the
home. Yet, as explained below, this apparent state-action distinction
is deceptive and ultimately unsatisfying. As this Article argues, there
90
is in fact no acceptable logical or doctrinal reason for this disconnect.
C. The Nature and Scope of Minors’ Bodily Integrity Right
Assuming minors have a constitutional right to bodily integrity—
whether within the family or outside it—what does that right look
like? And can it be universalized such that it applies equally to
infants, who lack decisional capacity entirely, and to teenagers who
are nearly adults? As noted above, the doctrine regulating children’s
bodies falls largely within the domain of family law and has been only
partly constitutionalized. At the same time, it appears that the
Supreme Court’s constitutional bodily integrity cases look to
common-law standards to delineate the contours of the constitutional
right. In the course of recognizing minors’ constitutional right to
choose abortion without parental involvement, the Supreme Court
invokes the mature-minor doctrine, as well as the best-interests-of91
the-child standard that is familiar to family law. These twin concerns
89. In one case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a clinic was not liable for failing
to comply with the state’s parental-notice law, in part because the minor was found to be a
“mature minor.” The court also found, however, that the parental-notice law was
unconstitutional. McGlothlin v. Bristol Obstetrics, Gynecology & Family Planning, Inc., No.
03A01-9706-CV-00236, 1998 WL 65459, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1998) (“Further as to the
issue of plaintiff’s capacity to consent which is predicated upon T.C.A. 39-15-202, the Court
finds that the record fails to rebut the presumption of capacity by the plaintiff to sign the
consent to abortion document as a mature minor.”).
90. See infra Part III.
91. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“A pregnant
minor is entitled to such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well
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of the minor abortion cases—maturity and best interests—map neatly
onto the two key aspects of the bodily integrity right as commonly
understood: autonomy and bodily security. Especially in the case of
older minors, who may be seeking control over their own medical
care or access to nonmedical interventions, their maturity primarily
entails a right to autonomy in making decisions about their own
bodies, rather than a right to be secure in their person. For younger
children, by contrast, the bodily integrity right primarily takes the
form of a right not to be subjected to physical abuse, unnecessary
medical treatment, and severe corporal punishment, rather than a
right to autonomy per se. The right to this form of bodily security is
essentially a right of children to have their best interests protected.
These two forms of the bodily integrity right are arguably relevant to
all minors, but the bodily security dimension is likely more important
for younger minors whereas the autonomy right is often more
important for older minors.
The cases that have already recognized a constitutional bodily
integrity right for minors speak of the right as one against “arbitrary”
92
or “unjustified” intrusions on the minor’s bodily security. In one
case involving an allegation of excessive corporal punishment by a
public-school teacher, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained
that the substantive due-process right to bodily integrity protected
minors against “violations of personal rights of privacy and bodily
security” that are “severe, . . . disproportionate to the need presented,
93
and . . . inspired by malice or sadism.” Key to these understandings
is a notion of protecting children from harm that is more than de
minimis in quality, and that is not of such a nature as to be potentially
94
beneficial to them. For example, a medically necessary surgery is a

enough to make her abortion decision . . . independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even
if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests.” (footnote omitted)); LESLIE J. HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & CAROL A.
WEISBROD, FAMILY LAW 589 (3d ed. 1996).
92. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 678 (1977) (“Among the historic
liberties so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified
intrusions on personal security.”).
93. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
94. Cf. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994) (“It is
incontrovertible that bodily integrity [protected by the Fourteenth Amendment] is necessarily
violated when a state actor sexually abuses a schoolchild. . . . [T]here is never any justification
for sexually molesting a schoolchild, and thus, no state interest, analogous to the punitive and
disciplinary objectives attendant to corporal punishment, which might support it.” (footnote
omitted)).

HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

BODILY INTEGRITY

3/25/2015 12:23 PM

1317

serious intrusion that may result in serious pain, but it is presumably
not a violation of a child’s right to bodily integrity if it relieves or
protects the child from more serious illness or harm.
Indeed, bodily integrity in the sense of the basic ability to protect
one’s body from harm and unwanted intrusion is an essential aspect
of the constitutional privacy doctrine in general, not simply as applied
to children. Emphasizing the need for pure physical security, one
scholar has similarly characterized the privacy right to bodily integrity
95
as “a presumptive right to simple physical existence in and of itself.”
Yet, autonomy is also an important aspect of the traditional
understanding of the right. In the context of privacy doctrine as
applied to adults, autonomy has long played a central role. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, for example, the joint opinion explained that
denying a woman the right to choose abortion “includes ‘the interest
96
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.’”
Speaking of the right to privacy in general, Professor Tom Gerety
contends that the essence of privacy is “control over who, if anyone,
will share in the intimacies of our bodies,” which in his view is
97
fundamental to human flourishing. Gerety continues: “All of this
comes in the end to a control over the most basic vehicle of selfhood:
the body. For control over the body is the first form of autonomy and
the necessary condition, for those who are not saints or stoics, of all
98
later forms.” Indeed, this description helpfully connects the concepts
99
of bodily integrity, privacy, and autonomy.
The minor abortion cases recognize two separate but related
rights, providing a model for a more general right of minors to bodily
integrity. The first is a right to autonomy in making certain
fundamental decisions, which is represented by the exception
allowing mature minors to consent on their own. For example, a
95. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1459 (1992).
96. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (quoting Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977)); see also id. at 857 (“Roe, however, may be
seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule . . . of personal autonomy and
bodily integrity . . . .”). Indeed, it is interesting that the Court cites Carey and several other cases
involving minors in this portion of its opinion. Professor Khiara Bridges and others have noted
the evolution of the Court’s language in substantive due-process cases from a rhetoric centered
on “privacy” to one centered on “liberty,” a move that has de-emphasized the importance of the
family as compared to the individual. See generally Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and
Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 137–45 (2011).
97. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 266 (1977).
98. Id.
99. Thomas, supra note 95, at 1459.
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concern for the autonomy of older, mature minors clarifies the
Court’s holding in Bellotti v. Baird that courts could not decide on
minors’ access to abortion based solely on their best interests, but
rather that minors must be allowed to consent to an abortion if they
100
are sufficiently mature to do so. The second is the right to
protection against bodily harm, which is roughly represented by the
best-interests prong allowing judges to grant minors access to
abortion without parental consent if it would be in their best interests.
Those twin aspects of minors’ bodily integrity rights assist in
conceptualizing a bodily integrity right that can apply across factual
contexts, both to older minors as well as to younger ones. For
younger minors, it is the pure best-interests, or bodily protection,
aspect of bodily integrity that is likely to be most relevant—for
example in the form of protection from abuse and from unwarranted
denial of medical care. For older minors, autonomy often comes into
play, especially in the context of reproductive health and other forms
of healthcare, as well as in choosing forms of bodily expression such
101
as tattoos and piercings. It thus appears that the minor abortion
cases can provide a model for a more universally recognized
constitutional right of minors to bodily integrity.
II. CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE FAMILY AND THE
ROLE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Thus far, this Article has discussed the notion of children’s
constitutional right to bodily integrity as a freestanding right, whether
against the state or against parents. However, any discussion of this
right would be incomplete without an acknowledgement of the
100. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979) (plurality opinion) (holding that the state
“cannot constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has
been determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she
has made”); see also id. at 642 (noting the severe consequences of “denying a minor the right to
make an important decision” such as the abortion decision). In addition, a large and growing
literature recognizes the developing decisional capacity of adolescents and older minors, and
calls on the law to grant minors autonomy rights that accord with their capacity. See, e.g.,
Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare
Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 283–91 (2005); cf.
Todres, supra note 11, at 1146–64 (urging that the law should take into account cultural
understandings of and approaches to maturity).
101. Cf. Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing,
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 77–78 (2006) (questioning
whether the state should be able to exercise its “usual parentalist role toward children” when
body modification is concerned, due to the expressive and identity interests involved, and
analogizing body-modification cases to minor abortion cases).
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profound importance of parental rights with respect to the very same
set of issues. Though the contours of the “family-privacy” or
102
there is no
“parental-rights” doctrine are notoriously vague,
question that parental rights include some measure of parental
control over children’s bodies. To the extent that such a right exists,
moreover, it seems inevitably to increase parents’ authority and limit
103
children’s authority with respect to children’s bodies. For example,
the right is widely understood to ground parental discretion exercised
in the context of body modification, medical decisionmaking, and
104
corporal punishment.
The origins of the constitutional doctrine of family privacy may
be traced to two Lochner-era cases, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters. Despite Meyer’s and Pierce’s questionable origins in
a constitutional doctrine guaranteeing not only the “liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
105
under their control,” but also the freedom to contract and the right
106
to pursue an occupation, they have demonstrated considerable
staying power. As recently as 2000, an eight-Justice majority of the
Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental nature of parents’ rights to
107
the custody and control of their children.

102. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights”, 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 628 (“What
the parental interest may mean—especially where it is pitted against the interests of children—
remains to be developed more fully.”); David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family
Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 551 (2008) (noting the current uncertainty regarding the “boundaries
and scope” of family privacy).
103. See generally Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 955, 986–87 (1993) (“The problem may be stated in simple terms: any allotment of liberty
to the parents necessarily diminishes the liberty of the child; conversely, any enhancement of a
child’s liberty curtails that of the parents.”); Hill, supra note 63, at 62–63 (“It should now be
clear that parents’ rights to make health care decisions for their children are fundamentally in
conflict with childrens’ rights to bodily integrity, at least where those rights apply—for example,
in the case of mature minors.”).
104. See, e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
constitutional right of parents to control their children includes the right to direct their medical
care); James G. Dwyer, Parental Entitlement and Corporal Punishment, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 189, 192–93 (2010) (noting the argument that parental rights ground parental authority
to punish children for discipline).
105. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
106. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
107. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see also David D. Meyer, Lochner
Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1141 & n.85
(2001) (noting that eight Justices recognized the fundamental quality of parental rights in Troxel
v. Granville).
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Yet, the Meyer and Pierce cases also gave rise to individual
constitutional privacy rights, such as the right to use contraception
108
and abortion. When these latter rights were applied to minors as
well, an inevitable clash was created between children’s constitutional
rights and parents’ constitutionally protected rights to family privacy
109
and noninterference with their childrearing decisions. Given these
decisions, any right of the child to make autonomous decisions
naturally reduces the parent’s right to make those decisions on her
behalf; any right of the child to claim the state’s protection against
neglect, exploitation, or harm by her parents automatically entails
greater intervention into the private realm of the family than the
parent would wish. Yet both kinds of rights share a pedigree, given
that they originate from the same doctrinal bloodline.
In addition, the tension between parents’ rights to familial
privacy and children’s rights to autonomy and protection arguably
reflects a tension within broader philosophical approaches to the
family—between liberal, individual-rights centered approaches and
communitarian or “parentalist” approaches. The birth of children’s
constitutional rights, as distinct from those of their parents, may be
loosely viewed as an outcropping or extension of the liberal view,
which emphasizes the state’s role in shaping future citizens and
promoting liberal values, while still leaving room for parents to
inculcate their own values. Familial rights, by contrast, fit more
comfortably within the parentalist tradition, which embodies a
traditional view, grounded in natural law, of the family as existing
outside of, and largely beyond the reach of, the state. Neither
110
tradition clearly dominates in constitutional jurisprudence.
In both traditions, of course, children are understood as
individuals with at least some needs and entitlements, and in both
traditions, families are accorded special status, requiring some
deference or presumption of noninterference from the state. Where
the two traditions differ is in how they mediate the potential conflict

108. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–153 (1973).
109. Dailey, supra note 103, at 986–87.
110. Cf. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 56
(2006) (noting that family-privacy law has been shaped by conflicting strands of liberal
individualism and Biblical traditionalism). The liberal and parentalist traditions roughly match
two predominant approaches to childhood in family law: the children’s-rights approach, which
reflects (and in many respects exceeds) the liberal viewpoint, and the dependency approach,
which assimilates with the parentalist viewpoint. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating
Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 540–41 (2014).
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between the state’s interest in according the children rights that may
be exercised without parental consent and the duty owed by the state
to tolerate some distinctiveness among families, which may not
always conform to the state’s desired value system.
This Part further explores the liberal and parentalist views of the
family, as well as the ways in which each of those contrasting
approaches is embodied in case law. Because neither approach
dominates, the law pertaining to children’s rights within the family
evinces tremendous incoherence. In particular, disagreements
between liberals and parentalists over the nature of the family and its
relationship to the state result in disagreements over whether the
state can be said to be acting, or intervening in the family, when the
law delegates authority to parents over children’s bodies.
A. The Liberal View of the Family
1. An Overview of the Liberal View of the Family. In evaluating
the relationship between the family and the state, liberal theory tends
to emphasize the importance of the family in serving the ends of the
state. For example, Professor Linda McClain takes the position that
families in democratic societies “are places of moral learning that may
create the good person and may contribute to creating the good
citizen,” in part by helping children acquire the values and capacities
111
that will enable them to participate in democratic self-government.
One such capacity is the capacity for autonomy, which develops as a
child matures. As such, both parents and governmental institutions,
such as schools, should support children’s increasing claims to
112
equality and increasing ability to make independent decisions.
Similarly, Professor Amy Gutmann argues that both parents and the
state should act in a paternalistic manner toward children to ensure
that they are eventually able to choose their own conception of the
113
good life and to participate in democratic self-government.
111. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY 67 (2006). As John Rawls explains, “the family is part of the basic
structure of civil society,” largely because “one of its essential roles is to establish the orderly
production and reproduction of society and of its culture from one generation to the next.”
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 398 (2d ed. 1997).
112. MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 68–70.
113. Amy Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 338, 349–50 (1980); cf. Dailey, supra note 103, at 993 (describing the Supreme Court’s
view of “the family as facilitating the development of responsible individuals” and thus as “an
instrument of the liberal state”).
AND
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Liberal theorists conceive of the relationship among a child, her
parents, and the state as deriving from this basic structure and
function of the family. According to McClain, the role of the state visà-vis the family is to instill children with civic virtues and to protect
children from harm, as in the case of abuse or neglect, but to abstain
from forcing upon them any particular substantive vision of what
114
constitutes a good or worthy life. To use explicitly Rawlsian terms,
the state should avoid imposing the dictates of any particular
115
“comprehensive . . . doctrine[].” These civic virtues, which the state
is justified in imposing on children, are the fundamental values that a
democratic society requires its citizens to accept, such as equality and
116
toleration for diversity. Thus, the state can and should act to mold
children into good citizens, which involves protecting them to
preserve their future options and capacities and allowing them to
exercise some autonomy commensurate with their developing
abilities.
The state’s obligation to protect children and instill civic virtues
still leaves room for some measure of family privacy in the liberal
vision. Because the state must refrain from imposing comprehensive
doctrines—indeed, because it must avoid imposing any values on
families except the most basic values fundamental to democratic selfgovernment—a large discretionary realm remains for parents to teach
children their own values and beliefs and to make decisions about
117
their children’s best interests. As Gutmann puts it, “Some values
must be imposed in any case. What is at issue here is not whose values
118
but what values ought to be imposed upon children.” Thus, parents
remain free to cultivate their values in their children, whereas the
state maintains the authority to impose those values necessary to
fostering future democratic citizenship and maintaining a full range of
119
opportunities for children’s futures.
Within the liberal philosophical framework, the state would have
the power to protect children’s bodily integrity against parental abuse
or neglect, consonant with its authority to protect individuals from
114. MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 78–84.
115. Id. at 47; see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36–39 (1993).
116. Professor Linda McClain writes of the government’s obligation to foster capacity,
equality, and responsibility, MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 4; Anne Dailey speaks of “family
justice,” Dailey, supra note 103, at 1016–18.
117. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 47–48; Gutmann, supra note 113, at 350–53.
118. Gutmann, supra note 113, at 351.
119. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 154–59 (1980).
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physical harm—physical security being a prerequisite for children’s
120
future citizenship. Beyond actions that constitute neglect, abuse, or
that otherwise inhibit children’s future choices, however, it seems that
in most cases the state would be required to tolerate differences in
121
parental decisionmaking with respect to children’s bodies.
At the same time, some liberal theorists contend that
adolescents, who are in the process of developing the capacity to
exercise the sort of autonomy that adult citizens may exercise, should
in some cases be authorized to exercise that autonomy regardless of
122
their parents’ wishes. This is because liberalism views consent, and
therefore the capacity for rationality, as a prerequisite to and basis for
123
individual-autonomy rights. As Gutmann explains “adolescents
must be granted some freedoms in order to help develop their
capacities to exercise their freedoms as adults,” but only in ways that
124
allow them to expand, rather than restrict, their future options.
This understanding of the relationship between autonomy and
freedom could lead to some idiosyncratic results. It might suggest, for
example, that minors ought to be permitted in some circumstances to
choose abortion but not childbearing without parental consent, given
that nonprocreation would keep the minor’s future options open but
carrying a child to term would foreclose many future opportunities.
Similarly, liberal theory might support a terminally ill minor’s right to
accept but not to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment.
Moreover, the state would have a stake in judging the reasons
why parents seek to make certain choices with respect to their
children’s bodies because those reasons may indicate the values that
are being supported and conveyed. Thus, the liberal view might
accept a parent’s decision to deny a child medical care because that
parent has made the informed judgment that the medical intervention
is likely to cause the child significant discomfort with only a small
chance of remedying the underlying condition—for example, in the

120. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 111, at 79–80 (mentioning the state’s parens patriae
interest in children’s health and safety, and noting that “if a religiously motivated family
practice seriously impaired a child’s development . . . , this would overcome the normal
deference to parental authority and trigger a strong governmental interest in prevention,
intervention, or amelioration”).
121. Cf. AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 69–73 (2003) (discussing parental
discretion with respect to male and female circumcision).
122. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 113, at 354–55.
123. See, e.g., id. at 339–40.
124. Id. at 354–55.
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case of an experimental cancer treatment. Such reasoning indicates
the decision is being made with the child’s best interests in mind. The
liberal view might, however, reject a parent’s decision to deny
medical care based on a judgment that it is better for the child to die
than to violate the parent’s religious beliefs, because that judgment
shows minimal concern for the child or her value as a citizen. Or, the
liberal state may judge mild corporal punishment that is practiced to
discipline a child differently from even mild physical pain inflicted on
125
a child out of a sadistic desire to harm. Relatedly, an evaluation of a
minor’s reason for making a particular decision—for example,
seeking an abortion—would be relevant to determining whether the
minor possesses sufficient capacity to exercise at least limited
decisionmaking authority.
Finally, although liberalism views the state as limited in its
authority to impose particular values on family life, we can infer that
liberal philosophy considers the state to be the ultimate source of
authority over children. The authority that parents have over their
children may be seen as delegated by the state, which is in charge of
determining the boundaries of its own power. This places liberal
theories of the family in direct contradiction to natural-law-derived
parentalist theories, which hold that parents’ authority over their
children is inherent, and that the state lacks authority to intervene
except perhaps in cases of abuse or neglect, in which the natural
126
family can be said to no longer exist in any meaningful sense.
2. The Liberal View of the Family in Case Law. Many cases—
particularly constitutional-rights cases from the 1970s onward—
127
appear to embody the liberal perspective. Unsurprisingly, the
abortion cases are the paradigm. As one would expect based on the
liberal understanding of the state’s role in the family, these
constitutional cases show a preoccupation with the parents’ reasoning
process, and even sometimes an eliding of roles of parent and state.
The state becomes, in some cases, a stand-in for the parent and vice
versa. This result should be expected, given that liberalism views the

125. See infra Part II.A.2.
126. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
887–88 (1984).
127. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 697–99 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
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state as central and the families as acting, to a great extent, in the
service of the state.
For example, in Bellotti, the seminal minor-rights abortion case,
a woman representing a “class of Massachusetts parents having
unmarried minor daughters who then were, or might become,
128
pregnant” was permitted to intervene to defend the statute. Yet,
although the parents attempted to raise their own rights as parents to
consent or withhold consent to their children’s decisions, the Bellotti
Court never directly addressed those claims and instead recognized
129
them only as an aspect of the state’s interest.
Furthermore, although Supreme Court jurisprudence gives
minors a fairly wide range of autonomy with respect to the abortion
decision—arguably more than they possess with respect to other
important medical-treatment decisions, for example—it also
demonstrates a strong preoccupation with minors’ reasoning and
decisionmaking process in this context. In practice, courts hearing
judicial-bypass petitions are consumed with evaluating the quality of
the reasoning by the minors who come before them seeking abortions
130
without parental consent. In any of thirty-seven states, minors can
avoid parental involvement in their abortion decisions only by going
to court and seeking a judge’s approval through a judicial-bypass
hearing. Professor Carol Sanger has examined the structure of these
hearings, finding that courts often focus on the decisionmaking
131
process of the teens who are seeking an abortion. Indeed, though
the law is largely lacking in standards for determining whether a
minor is mature enough to make the abortion decision on her own, an
examination of her thought process is one obvious way to reach such
132
a determination.

128. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 627.
129. Id. at 638–39, 648.
130. Thirty-eight states require parental involvement in minors’ abortion decisions. Of
those, twenty-six require parental consent and twelve require only parental notification. Thirtyseven states have alternate judicial-bypass procedures available. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE
POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS’ ABORTIONS 2 (2015), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.
131. Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse
of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 430 (2009).
132. See id. at 430–31. According to Professor Sanger, such hearings perform other functions
as well: they are themselves punitive, shaming devices. Comparing bypass hearings to sixteenthcentury French “pardon tales,” whereby those who had committed capital offenses sought the
mercy of the sovereign, Sanger observes that teenagers’ bypass narratives “similarly seek to
persuade by accounting for past actions” in a compelled story of remorse. Id. at 460, 466–67.
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The Supreme Court cases also evince an unusual concern with
parental reasoning and decisionmaking processes. Early in the Bellotti
litigation, the Supreme Court decided to certify several questions
about statutory construction to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
133
Court. In particular, the Court was concerned with whether an
arbitrary third-party veto was created by the statutory phrasing,
which required parental consent but provided for a judicial order
134
bypassing the consent requirement “for good cause shown.” The
district court thus inquired of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court what standards were to be applied in determining whether the
abortion could go forward, both by the parents and by the court
135
hearing a bypass petition. In response, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court asserted that both the court and the minor’s parents
were permitted only to consider the minor’s best interests in deciding
136
whether to allow the abortion. Presumably, this meant the parents
could not rely on their own religious or other ethical beliefs in
withholding consent. With respect to parental decisionmaking under
the statute, the court added: “There is, of course, no penalty if a
parent does not apply the proper standard in deciding whether to
consent to his or her child’s request for consent to an abortion. Our
answer may be of assistance, however, in guiding parents’
137
consideration of the question . . . .”
The court’s caveat
notwithstanding, it would be an understatement to say that it is
unusual for courts to examine parental decisionmaking within intact
families so closely; nonetheless, this micromanagement is arguably
quite consistent with a liberal view of the family and the state’s notinsignificant role in shaping it.
This approach to parental decisionmaking is not just present in
138
constitutional cases. In the case of In re Marriage of Boldt, the
Supreme Court of Oregon addressed the issue of who had
decisionmaking authority over a twelve-year-old boy’s circumcision,
139
when the divorced parents disagreed on the issue. The court first
stated, in a more parentalist vein, that the law granted “authority [to]
the custodial parent to make medical decisions for his or her child,
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 134 (1976).
Id. at 134–35.
Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 292 (Mass. 1977).
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293.
In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388 (Or. 2008).
Id. at 389–91.
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including decisions involving elective procedures and decisions that
140
may involve medical risks.” But the opinion quickly took a liberal
turn. The court emphasized that, “although circumcision is an
invasive medical procedure that results in permanent physical
alteration of a body part and has attendant medical risks, the decision
to have a male child circumcised for medical or religious reasons is
one that is commonly and historically made by parents in the United
141
States.” Thus, the parents’ reasons for choosing the procedure were
scrutinized by the court and found to be appropriate. Although
purporting to take a hands-off approach to parental decisionmaking
in this domain, the court felt compelled to offer a liberal justification
for its ruling by situating the decision as normal and socially
142
acceptable.
143
In similar terms, the court in Hart v. Brown focused on the
reasonableness of the parents’ decision to authorize kidney
144
transplantation from one seven-year-old twin to the other.
Articulating its standard for validating the operation, the court stated
that “the natural parents would be able to substitute their consent for
that of their minor children after a close, independent and objective
145
investigation of their motivation and reasoning.”
The court
146
ultimately found that the parents’ reasoning was “morally sound,”
based on the testimony of clergy and psychiatrists, and that the
parents’ “motivation and reasoning are favorably reviewed by a
147
community representation which includes a court of equity.”
The legality of a parent’s corporal punishment of a child also
depends in part on the reasons or intent behind the act. In one case,
the court showed a particular concern with the parent’s reasons for
punishing the child in a particular way, even after suggesting that the

140. Id. at 393.
141. Id. at 394.
142. In addition, the court seemed uncomfortable with the prospect of forcing circumcision
on an unwilling twelve-year-old: it therefore remanded for the trial court to determine whether
the child truly agreed to the procedure, as the father had asserted, not because of the minor’s
rights, but because opposition by the child might “affect [the] father’s ability to properly care
for” him. Id. at 394–95.
143. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
144. Id. at 387.
145. Id. at 390.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 391.
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parent’s state of mind was irrelevant. After first announcing that
“we evaluate a claim of abuse by looking to the harm suffered by the
child, rather than the mental state of the accused abuser, because
‘[t]he main goal of [the relevant law] is to protect children,’” the New
Jersey appellate court then proceeded to evaluate the
appropriateness of a mother’s striking of her child in precisely those
149
purportedly irrelevant terms.
Although first noting that the
resulting injury was not particularly serious, the court then took into
account “the reasons underlying” the mother’s actions as well as the
fact that she “accepted full responsibility for her actions” and “was
150
contrite.” Thus, the case law generally supports the parent’s
authority to use nonexcessive force for disciplinary purposes, but not
151
for other purposes. Indeed, one court referenced a nineteenthcentury English case holding that the whipping of a two-and-one-halfyear-old was excessive on the ground that “although a father might
correct a child, such physical force . . . was beyond her capacity to
152
understand.” Presumably, the punishment could not be expected to
153
perform its corrective or expressive function.
B. The Parentalist View of the Family
1. An Overview of the Parentalist View of the Family. The
parentalist or communitarian perspective views the family as a
bulwark against the standardizing force of the state, rather than as an
154
instrument the state uses to fulfill its own ends. Parentalism is
148. Dep’t of Children & Families v. K.A., 996 A.2d 1040, 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010).
149. Id. at 1044 (quoting G.S. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 723 A.2d 612 (N.J. 1999).
150. Id. at 1045.
151. Dwyer, supra note 104, at 192–93. But see Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1391–
92 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a mother did not have a clearly established constitutional right
to hit her son with a belt without state interference as a means of discipline).
152. In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977) (citing R. v. Griffin, [1869]
11 Cox 402).
153. The fundamental right to control the education and upbringing of one’s children is
often mentioned in passing, and some commentators have noted that this constitutional right
may ground the law’s privileging of reasonable corporal punishment. See, e.g., Willis v. State,
888 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind. 2008); Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A
Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 453–56 (2002). Within the parental corporalpunishment context, however, constitutional claims do not appear to have much traction.
Sweaney, 119 F.3d at 1391–92 (holding that parental rights do not prevent the state from
imposing criminal penalties when corporal punishment on a child is deemed excessive).
154. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70
Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1209–10, 1222–23 (1997) (illustrating the value of
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concerned with protecting the right of parents to immerse their
children in their own values, even when those values conflict with the
155
majority’s. Parentalists worry that “abandoning [youth] to their
‘rights’” is a very poor way to serve children’s interests and needs,
156
which sound in care more than in liberation. In these scholars’ view,
parents are clearly the superior decisionmakers for their children
157
because they love them and want what is best for them. In contrast
to liberal theorists, parentalists tend to believe that parents have
some inherent rights over their children—by most accounts grounded
in natural law—that extend well beyond the “right” to do what is in
the children’s best interests and to shape them into well-qualified
158
future members of the polity.
Of course, even the fiercest proponents of parental rights
support exceptions to parental authority when the state’s interest is
truly compelling—as in cases of abuse or neglect—but they would
preserve a wide range of parental control when parents’ actions fall
159
short of such extremes. Where they differ from liberal theorists,
then, is that parentalists would limit the state’s authority to intervene
in the family to cases of abuse, neglect, and unfitness, whereas liberals
would grant the state broader authority to create rules that would
encourage the child’s development of basic citizenship values and
exposure to many possible understandings of the good life.
Moreover, parentalists are critical of the view that minors with
some capacity for autonomy can and should be permitted to make
families as potential centers of dissent and rejecting the “liberal vision” of the family as a “little
citizen-making factory” that assists the state in its standardizing mission).
155. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 937, 948–50, 971, 998–99 (1996) (suggesting that, following the liberal approach, many
parents will nonetheless want “to have it both ways: to use the state’s power to privilege and
enhance their efforts to pass on their values to their children, while undermining the ability of
parents in the minority to do the same”); Gutmann, supra note 113, at 351 (noting the argument
that under the liberal view, the democratic state “is simply imposing its values upon children”).
156. Hafen, supra note 102, at 651 (quoting PANEL DISCUSSION REMARKS OF ALBERT
SOLNIT, CHILD ADVOCACY CONFERENCE, MADISON, WISCONSIN, SEPT. 26, 1975).
157. Id. at 651–53; see also MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS 46 (2005) (arguing that “the core of the parental rights doctrine guarantees children at
least that the important decisions in their lives will be made by those who are most likely to
know them best and to care the most for them”); cf. Brian Bix, Philosophy, Morality, and
Parental Authority, 40 FAM. L.Q. 7, 17–19 (2006) (arguing that parental priority may be justified
by parents’ superiority as decisionmakers for their children).
158. E.g., Hafen, supra note 102, at 616–17 (describing “plenary” parental authority over
children derived from “natural individual rights” that “are thought to antedate the state in
American political philosophy”); id. at 619–22.
159. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 157, at 36–37; Hafen, supra note 102, at 617.
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decisions for themselves commensurate with that autonomy. In
their view, as long as a minor child is still within parental custody and
161
control, there is no warrant for overriding parental prerogatives.
Finally, whereas an evaluation of parents’ and children’s reasons is
perfectly consonant with liberalism’s understanding of the role of the
state, parentalists would find such evaluation to be overly intrusive.
So long as parents are fit, the state is neither competent nor
authorized to evaluate the parental decisionmaking process; the
state’s inability to interfere in the family is virtually jurisdictional in
162
nature. Thus, as applied to decisionmaking over children’s bodies, it
seems that any parental decision falling short of abuse or neglect
could not be regulated—including practices, such as circumcision,
tattooing, and piercing, that are permanent and may affect the child’s
163
future options or identity. The notion of a child’s right to bodily
integrity, separate and apart from the parent’s rights, is therefore
largely inconsistent with the parentalist perspective.
2. The Parentalist View of the Family in Case Law. The language
of cases such as Meyer and Pierce reflect a parentalist point-of-view.
These cases emphasize that the Constitution supports parents’ right
to avoid the state’s “standardiz[ing]” and indoctrinating force when it
164
comes to children.
Indeed, one scholar has persuasively
demonstrated that these cases view the child as mere property of the
parents, and that the briefs in Pierce drew explicitly upon natural-law
165
views of parental authority as natural and god-given. In Pierce, for
example, the Supreme Court sweepingly proclaimed that “[t]he
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize

160. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 113, at 354–55.
161. Hafen, supra note 102, at 648–49.
162. Cf. Bix, supra note 157, at 19 (arguing that, for reasons of both family privacy and
institutional incompetence, “courts should not be investigating how good the reasons are” for
certain parental decisions).
163. As discussed below, the definitions of abuse and neglect are themselves somewhat
malleable. See infra notes 281–87 and accompanying text; see also Ian Hacking, The Making and
Molding of Child Abuse, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 253, 253 (1991) (arguing that the general
conception of child abuse has been in flux for more than thirty years); Hafen, supra note 102, at
617–18 (noting that “judicial perceptions of abuse and neglect have varied over time”).
164. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
402 (1923).
165. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1102 (1992).
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its children” through control over education. Indeed, the Court
continued, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
167
obligations.” For support, the Court drew upon its decision two
years earlier in Meyer, in which it condemned as unconstitutional the
Nebraska legislature’s “desire . . . to foster a homogeneous people”
through a law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in the
schools, and compared the state’s vision to the familial dystopias of
Plato’s Republic and ancient Sparta, in which children were raised by
168
the community rather than their own parents.
In emphasizing this concern about enforced homogeneity and
“communal ownership” of children, Meyer and Pierce arguably reflect
a fear of totalitarian influence by the state, against which family
169
privacy serves as a necessary protection.
Indeed, this
antitotalitarianism is also one plausible understanding of the goal and
170
purpose of the privacy doctrine itself. The constitutional law of
privacy, according to one scholar, is concerned with preventing “a
society standardized and normalized, in which lives are too
171
substantially or too rigidly directed.” The concern would appear to
be particularly great with respect to excessive intervention in the
family, which is often viewed as both a refuge from society at large
and as a place for the private formation of moral values and beliefs—
172
even if those values and beliefs differ from those of society.
Similarly, early provisions of law apparently enacted for the
protection of children—for example, laws preventing minors from
entering military service without parental consent—were not
understood to confer any rights upon the children themselves and
173
were held to be waivable by the minors’ parents. Even in Prince v.

166. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
167. Id.
168. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
169. This is the view of Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Woodhouse, supra note
165, at 1089–91.
170. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 26 (1989)
(describing the conventional or idealized view of the family); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1504–05 (1983);
Woodhouse, supra note 165, at 1090.
173. Morrissey v. Perry, 137 U.S. 157, 157 (1890).
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Massachusetts, which affirmed the power of the state to interfere
with parental decisions by applying child-labor laws, the Court still
endorsed the parentalist perspective in dicta. For example, the Court
stated that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder,” and that
175
there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”
This language, which indicates the state’s powerlessness to control
family life and affirms the notion of a sort of pre- or extrapolitical set
of “obligations” that ground parental rights, is steeped in the
parentalist mindset.
Deference to parents, rather than a concern for the interests of
either the child or the state, thus drives the logic of those early
parentalist cases. In light of Meyer, Pierce, and Prince, more modern
cases, too, evince a strain of parentalism. For example, Troxel v.
Granville—in which the Justices reaffirmed by an eight-to-one vote
that family privacy is a fundamental constitutional right—is
176
permeated with parentalist language. In that case, the Court
considered a Washington state statute that allowed any person to
petition for visitation rights to a child and allowed the court to grant
visitation merely on a finding that it would be in the child’s best
177
interests. The Supreme Court found the statute insufficiently
178
deferential to parental rights. Emphasizing that the statute did not
require a showing of parental unfitness, the Court assumed that the
state was disabled from interfering in the private family domain on a
179
mere determination of best interests.
Moreover, the statute
privileged the government’s decisionmaking over the parents’:
[T]he Washington statute places the best-interest determination
solely in the hands of the judge. Should the judge disagree with the
parent’s estimation of the child’s best interests, the judge’s view
174. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
175. Id. at 166.
176. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting the “fundamental
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”);
id. at 66 (discussing “broad parental authority” (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979))); id. at 68–69 (“[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing
of that parent’s children.”).
177. Id. at 60.
178. Id. at 67.
179. Id. at 68–69.
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necessarily prevails. Thus, in practical effect, in the State of
Washington a court can disregard and overturn any decision by a fit
custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party
affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the
180
judge’s determination of the child’s best interests.

This Court’s distress over the state court’s readiness to intervene
stands in stark contrast to the holdings in Bellotti and other cases in
which the state courts closely scrutinize parental decisionmaking
181
despite the parents’ unquestioned fitness.
Some state court cases have also assumed the parentalist
182
viewpoint. For example, in Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hospital, a New
York court found that a couple had the right, as parents, to have their
newborn son circumcised by a religious practitioner called a mohel,
183
rather than by a physician. The court even appeared to treat the
parents as the patients, rather than the child, holding that to deny the
circumcision would violate a state law protecting “patient[s’] civil and
184
religious liberties.” In a similar vein, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that parents could not be required to allow their three-year-old
child to undergo chemotherapy, which had a 40 percent chance of
185
success in his case. Although the court acknowledged the child’s
interests, it also emphasized the “primacy of the familial unit” and the
“[p]arental authority to make fundamental decisions for minor
children,” in ultimately upholding the parents’ right to deny
186
treatment.
187
Finally, many commentators consider Parham v. J.R. to be a
188
profoundly parentalist case. Decided the same year as Bellotti,

180. Id. at 67.
181. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390–91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Baird v. Attorney Gen.,
360 N.E.2d 288, 292–93 (Mass. 1977); Dep’t of Children & Families v. K.A., 996 A.2d 1040, 1045
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
182. Oliner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 431 N.Y.S. 2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
183. Id. at 272.
184. Id. at 272 (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c (McKinney 2011)).
185. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1991).
186. Id. at 1115.
187. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
188. Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 391–92 (1997); But see Ouellette, supra note 68, at 971
(“Although Parham is frequently cited as a strong authority for parental rights and as the case
that reversed the trend toward protecting children’s rights, it is actually a case in which the court
found enough risk of error in parental judgment about what is in a child’s best interests that it
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Parham dealt with the liberty interest of children whose parents
189
wished to commit them to mental hospitals, often indefinitely.
“[A]bsent a finding of neglect or abuse,” the Court held, the parents’
determination of the child’s best interests should normally be
respected, and they should “retain a substantial, if not the dominant,
190
role in the decision.” The parents’ decision would be subject to
review by an independent third party, but not necessarily by a state
191
agent—a staff physician’s approval would suffice. Yet, it is less
recognized that Parham contains elements of the liberal perspective
as well. The Court’s recognition of a liberty right of children that
applies to counteract the traditional presumption in favor of parental
decisionmaking is in fact rather unusual; few other medical decisions,
besides abortion, are constitutionally required to be subjected to any
outside scrutiny. Indeed, the Court in Parham even discussed how the
neutral party should make the decision, specifying that the child must
192
be interviewed and all aspects of his background taken into account.
C. Summary
The parentalist and liberal perspectives coexist within
constitutional privacy doctrine. The presence of these conflicting
viewpoints on the nature of the family and the source of family
authority has led to a notable incoherence within the case law.
Indeed, this conflict may be partly responsible for the fact that
children are recognized as independent rights-holders in some
contexts but not others: the liberal individual-rights perspective
dominates abortion jurisprudence, which is of relatively recent
vintage, whereas more traditional notions hold sway with respect to
193
corporal punishment and medical decisionmaking.
Another consequence of these conflicting perspectives, discussed
below, is that state action is unusually difficult to identify in cases
involving children’s right to bodily integrity within the family.
Whether one perceives that the state has acted or not is a function of
one’s baseline understanding of the relationship between the family
held that the constitution required procedural protections for the child before the parental
decision could be implemented.”).
189. Parham, 442 U.S. at 587.
190. Id. at 604.
191. Id. at 604–07.
192. Id. at 606–07.
193. Cf. Hamilton, supra note 110, at 33 (arguing that the conflicting traditions informing
family law have caused its incoherence).
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and the state. If, as liberal philosophy assumes, the state is the source
of all legitimate coercive force within society and is understood as
simply delegating broad discretion to parents to make decisions for
their children without state approval or intervention, then the state is,
in some important sense, acting whenever it delegates authority to
parents to make decisions on behalf of their children, who are
themselves rights-holders. However, if parental authority over
children preexists the state and cannot be touched by it, as
parentalists and natural-law theorists assume, then the state acts only
when it removes parental authority, not when it grants it. The
parentalist perspective views removing parental authority over
children as an intervention within the family, whereas allowing
parental control is not.
The conflicting perspectives pervade the case law pertaining to
minors’ bodily integrity rights, rendering the concept of state action
incoherent. For example, in Danforth, the Supreme Court struck
down a statute requiring parental consent for minors seeking
abortions, stating that “the State does not have the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate
194
the patient’s pregnancy.” The case thus figures state action,
according to the liberal perspective, as the allocation of control to the
parent over the minor’s abortion decision. From the parentalist
perspective, however, one could just as easily understand parentalconsent laws, which permit certain minors to access abortions without
parental involvement, as intervening in the family to reduce parental
195
rights. Similarly, if there is state action when the law requires

194. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). It is notable that
the state seemingly can and does give the veto right over the minor’s decision to a judge—by
means of the judicial-bypass procedure—just not to a minor’s parent. Moreover, not unlike Roe,
Danforth speaks as much about the physician as it does about the patient, thus suggesting that
Danforth is in fact a case about physician’s rights. Nonetheless, it remains one of the strongest
statements in the law of minors’ health-care autonomy rights, and the physicians’-rights
rationale has not found support in later cases. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (describing the physician’s constitutional rights in the abortion context as
“derivative of the woman’s position”).
195. In Bellotti v. Baird, a class of parents of unmarried minors had intervened on the side of
the defendant and raised an independent claim of parental rights in the Bellotti litigation, but
that claim was never directly addressed. Instead, the Court converted the apparent
constitutional claim for violation of the parents’ fundamental rights—through state laws that
apparently granted minors permission to seek abortions without parental consent in some
circumstances—into a mere “interest” in family integrity and parental decisionmaking that the
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minors to seek parental consent for abortion, then there should
logically also be state action when the common law grants parents the
196
authority to make medical-treatment decisions for their children.
However, that doctrinal field is not permeated by constitutional
claims, as one would expect, if courts understood states to be acting in
ways that affect minors’ bodily integrity.
III. INTEGRATING THE BODY OF LAW: DOCTRINAL
AND CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES
There are two principal problems that plague any attempt to
identify and establish the contours of a constitutional bodily integrity
right for children against their parents. The first problem is a
doctrinal one—identifying state action. Most interactions in which
parents affect or supersede minors’ choices about their bodies do not
involve state actors. Yet, it turns out that the problem of identifying
state action in such cases is in fact quite complex. It is difficult to say
with any clarity why and when courts identify state action in cases
involving intrusion on minors’ bodily integrity within the family.
The second problem is a conceptual problem that plagues any
attempt to create or enforce a true privacy right for minors within the
family. The creation of a privacy right inevitably—and ironically—
invites the state to police the scope and applicability of that right.
Although this irony appears to some degree whenever an individual
attempts to assert a privacy right against the state, thereby inviting
the judicial arm of the state to decide on the appropriate limits of her
privacy, this irony is particularly acute with respect to privacy claims
within the family. Any time a child asserts a bodily integrity right
against her parents, she is inviting the state to examine both her own
decisionmaking and that of her parents. The child is therefore
requesting the state to intervene in the presumptively private domain,
as well as to judge the suitability of the reasons for her decision. State
regulation of an individual’s reasons for a decision is, however,
state was permitted, but not required, to vindicate. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 627, 637–41
(1979) (plurality opinion).
196. Cf. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra note 7, at 157 n.13 (“The Court presumably concluded
that the existence of a statute creating a parental veto over the abortion decision constituted
state action in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth; otherwise the due process claim
could never have been reached.” (citation omitted)); In re L., 632 A.2d 59, 61 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1993) (finding that a man’s attempt to get a court order requiring a sixteen-year-old girl to
undergo blood testing for paternity was not a case of “coercive interference with the rights of
another” but rather of “a private party . . . seek[ing] to employ the coercive hand of the court”).
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directly in opposition to the notion of a true privacy or
decisionmaking autonomy right.
A. Doctrinal Difficulties in Identifying State Action
Though identifying state action is rarely a straightforward
197
proposition, three state-action problems particularly plague cases
involving minors’ right to bodily integrity. The first is the problem
that, although there may be state action, there is often no state actor
involved in situations in which minors’ bodily integrity right is
implicated, at least until the moment of enforcement. This makes the
state action more difficult to identify. The second problem is that the
state actions impinging on minors’ bodily integrity right are often
broad common-law or statutory rules that, on their face, do not
appear to infringe the minors’ right; this effect is apparent only in
their application. And third, there is the problem of identifying a
relevant baseline for determining whether state action has occurred.
Because of this baseline problem, even when a state actor is
identifiable, it may be difficult to discern when the state has truly
“acted” at all.
1. No State Actor. In the various doctrinal areas discussed above,
decisions are made that affect children’s bodily integrity in various
ways, but they generally do not involve state actors. Instead, they
involve parents, children, and sometimes other private parties, such as
physicians. When a state actor is in the picture—for example, a
public-school teacher or a social worker—courts have no difficulty
recognizing the applicability of the constitutional right to bodily
198
integrity. By contrast, there is no apparent state action when a child
suffers at the hands of an abusive parent, or when a parent consents
to or withholds healthcare for a minor child, such as a tonsillectomy
199
or circumcision, in a private-hospital setting.

197. See, e.g., Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 283 (2013).
198. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1994); T.M. ex
rel. Cox v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (D. Wyo. 2000).
199. Cf. Kia P. v. McIntyre, 2 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[I]nsofar as its
employees provided medical care to Mora during her hospitalization, [the hospital] did not
engage in state action that would subject it to liability under § 1983.”), aff’d, 235 F.3d 749 (2d
Cir. 2000); Novak v. Cobb Cnty.-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1578 (N.D. Ga.
1994) (finding no state action when private physicians provided a blood transfusion to a child
against the parents’ wishes), aff’d, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Thus, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
200
Services, the Supreme Court held that no constitutional cause of
action existed for Joshua DeShaney, a toddler who was beaten by his
father to the point of profound brain damage, even though the county
social-services department was aware of the situation and had failed
201
to remove Joshua from the abusive environment. The Court’s
opinion in DeShaney framed the issue as whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled a child in Joshua
DeShaney’s circumstances to the affirmative protection of the state
202
against private violence. One might also conceptualize the issue,
however, as one of state action. In this view, DeShaney’s
constitutional claim failed because there was no state actor that
appeared to be directly responsible for the violation of his bodily
integrity.
Yet, as the liberal perspective urges, parents’ custody and control
of their children can fairly be said to exist by virtue of common law,
statutory law, or a combination of the two. Thus, the state-action
concept “does not apply comfortably to children, who are routinely
subject to privately undertaken action authorized by state law in some
203
sense.” Indeed, even in the case of Joshua DeShaney, the abusive
father was entitled to maintain custody of him because of his legal
rights as a parent; if a neighbor had sought to save Joshua by
kidnapping him, the legal system would surely have operated to
punish the neighbor and return Joshua to his parents. Similarly, the
power of parents to make medical decisions for their children, with
some exceptions, is granted by statute, common law, or both, in every
204
state. Thus, state action is involved and the minor’s constitutional
right to bodily integrity is potentially implicated when a parent
authorizes a medically unnecessary procedure or refuses to authorize
205
medically necessary care for a child.
200. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
201. Id. at 191–94.
202. Id. at 195–97.
203. Teitelbaum and Ellis, supra note 7, at 157 n.13. They note that there has arguably been
state action in many cases by virtue of a common-law rule granting parental authority over
children; but, they continue, “it is possible that these approaches prove too much as a general
theory. Would it not follow that parental consent to a tonsilectomy [sic] or to enrollment in a
private school will equally satisfy the state action requirement, and does that result seem
consistent with the constitutional policies underlying that doctrine?” Id. at 158 n.13.
204. See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text.
205. Moreover, the state acts in all of these situations by designating who the child’s parents
are in the first place—that is, who has a right to custody and authority to consent to medical
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The problem, however, is that state action is only apparent at the
moment in which the legal entitlements of a party are enforced; once
a police officer or juvenile-court judge enters the picture, the state
action becomes apparent. But in many other contexts, courts
routinely recognize state action and apply constitutional rules in civil
suits between private parties. For example, in New York Times Co. v.
206
Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
imposed limits on the scope of a newspaper’s liability for libel in a suit
207
between private parties. “It matters not,” the Court said, “that that
law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only,
though supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which
state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such
208
power has in fact been exercised.”
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Blackard v. Memphis Area
209
Medical Center for Women is a case in point. In Blackard, parents,
along with their minor daughter, sued a Tennessee abortion clinic for
performing an abortion on the minor without parental consent while
210
the state’s parental-consent law was temporarily enjoined. Given
that the law was ultimately found constitutional and that the
defendant clinic was not protected by the preliminary injunction
because it was not a party to the suit, the parents of the minor argued
that the clinic should have sought parental consent before
211
proceeding. Yet, the Sixth Circuit held that parental consent could
not have been required because the state had not created a judicial212
bypass procedure as required by Bellotti. Though the suit between
the parties was a private suit for battery, the court held, essentially,
that common-law enforcement of the battery right would have
care. The rules of parentage are themselves legally constructed, not natural or inevitable, as
demonstrated by the increasing prevalence of legally sanctioned families headed by same-sex
couples. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 293 (2006) (“[D]efault parentage
rules, like all legal classifications, reflect choices made by the rulemaker.”).
206. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
207. Id. at 265.
208. Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court
considered whether judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant among private parties
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 4. The Court ultimately recognized both state action
resulting from the operation of common-law rules and also the applicability of constitutional
norms to the dispute between private parties. Id. at 17–18.
209. Blackard v. Memphis Area Med. Ctr. for Women, 262 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2001).
210. Id. at 570–71.
211. Id. at 570–72.
212. Id. at 577.

HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1340

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/25/2015 12:23 PM

[Vol. 64:1295

constituted state action that, as applied in this case, would have
213
violated the minor’s abortion rights.
In many cases involving infringements of children’s bodily
integrity within the family, however, children will not have access to
courts, nor will anyone other than the parents be able to raise their
214
children’s right to bodily integrity. The state action is thus obscured,
leading courts to view the problem as one of individuals seeking
protection against intrusions by “private actors” or state “inaction,”
when in fact, the state action is present in state-created rules and
215
entitlements. Indeed, the rule that prevents minors from accessing
courts independently is, itself, a legal rule and hence a form of state
action, rather than a natural or inevitable state of affairs.
A state-court case involving a minor’s reproductive rights further
216
demonstrates this difficulty. In Powers v. Floyd, the Texas Court of
Appeals considered whether a doctor who performed an abortion on
a sixteen-year-old minor in 1974 without that minor’s permission, but
with her mother’s permission, could be held liable for failing to obtain
217
proper informed consent. The court decided that, as a matter of
state statutory law, the doctor was under no duty to obtain the
minor’s informed consent to the procedure because state law clearly
218
granted authority over the minor’s medical treatment to the parent.
At the same time, although the court acknowledged that the U.S.
Supreme Court had recognized a right of mature minors to make
their own abortion decisions after the abortion at issue had occurred,
213. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650–51 (1979) (plurality opinion).
214. Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15–16 (2004) (noting that even
a parent does not always have the authority to raise the rights of his child in a lawsuit,
particularly when the parent’s and child’s interests conflict), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). An exception is those cases in which a
parent seeks to withhold medically necessary care. If a physician or hospital is alerted to the
denial of care—for example, because the child has been taken to a doctor but the parent refuses
to proceed with a recommended course of treatment—the hospital or department of social
services will sometimes invoke the court’s jurisdiction, seeking an order allowing the treatment
to take place over the parents’ objections. See, e.g., In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1384
(1986). In addition, courts are often called upon to adjudicate minors’ rights when parents
disagree, or when parents may face a conflict of interest (such as sibling organ donation). In
such cases, however, the courts generally do not perceive the case as implicating constitutional
bodily integrity rights, likely because of the two other state-action problems discussed below.
215. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 204 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
216. Powers v. Floyd, 904 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
217. Id. at 714. The doctor performed the abortion without telling the minor that she was
pregnant or that the pregnancy was being terminated. Id. at 714–15.
218. Id. at 716–18.

HILL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

BODILY INTEGRITY

3/25/2015 12:23 PM

1341

it noted that those Supreme Court decisions “do not attempt to
219
impose a legal duty upon a physician.” Thus, as the court noted in
passing, there would be no constitutional claim because “the
constitution does not provide or create a right against a private actor
220
absent state action.” It is not clear, however, why the Texas
common law, statutes, and judicial enforcement thereof, would not
constitute sufficient state action to implicate the minor’s
constitutional right in this scenario, and therefore to require
application of constitutional norms. Powers thus demonstrates the
difficulty of identifying state action when no state actor is present.
2. Facially Neutral Rules. A second state-action problem
inherent in cases dealing with minors’ bodily integrity right is that the
relevant state action is usually in the form of broad, facially neutral
rules, such as those that give parents the authority to make medical
decisions for minor children, rather than rules that specifically
reference particular procedures that parents can authorize for minors,
such as laws requiring parental consent for abortion. When a law
broadly delegates authority over medical decisionmaking for children
or otherwise grants parents sweeping control over their children, it
makes it possible for a parent to violate a child’s bodily integrity. It
does not, however, mandate such a result in every case as parents may
exercise their authority in a constitutional manner in the vast majority
of cases. As a result, the infringement on minors’ bodily integrity
results exclusively from particular applications of those facially
neutral rules. There may be nothing constitutionally objectionable,
for example, in the general common-law presumption or statutory
rule that parents have the authority to make medical decisions for
their minor children. Indeed, parents’ constitutional rights might even
require such a presumption in favor of them as above all other
221
decision-makers. If that parental authority is used to prevent a
minor from obtaining an abortion that is in her best interests or to
impose unnecessary and unwanted cosmetic surgery on the minor,
however, the bodily integrity right is implicated.

219. Id. at 716.
220. Id. (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)). The court also
noted that the minor abortion cases post-dated the abortion in the case at hand. Id.
221. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children.”).
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This problem calls to mind Shelley v. Kraemer, which involved
the constitutionality of a court enforcing a private contract—
specifically, a racially restrictive covenant. Although the state had
clearly acted in Shelley through its enforcement of common-law
contract rules, the more difficult problem was determining whether
the state action was the source of the constitutional violation, or
223
whether the violation could be attributed only to a private actor. As
numerous commentators have noted, Shelley’s attribution of private
discrimination to courts enforcing private agreements pursuant to
neutral-contract principles is potentially so expansive as to undermine
any line between state-sponsored discrimination, which is
224
unconstitutional, and private discrimination, which is not. For this
reason, Shelley’s rationale has rarely, if ever, been applied in
225
subsequent cases.
Thus, in the case of children’s right to bodily integrity, it is
sometimes obvious that state action is present, but it is not clear
whether the state action itself is violative of the child’s right. For
example, when a parent seeks to withhold medical care from a child,
pursuant to the parent’s general legal right to make medical decisions
for his or her children, courts may become involved at the behest of
hospitals or physicians who wish to impose care. In such cases, courts
do not generally address whether the child’s constitutional right to
bodily integrity would be violated by a court order permitting the
226
parent to withhold care. Instead, such cases are decided based on
neutral principles of law such as a determination of the harm to the
child and whether specific abuse or neglect statutes would be
227
violated. Although the state is clearly acting in such cases when it
222. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
223. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1522 (4th ed. 2001) (articulating this interpretation of
Shelley); Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 451, 458 (2007).
224. Rosen, supra note 223, at 459.
225. Id. at 458.
226. My research has not turned up any cases in which the minor’s constitutional right to
bodily integrity was referenced in connection with a parent’s request to withhold medical care.
227. Indeed, in a related context, Professor James Dwyer has gone so far as to argue—in
response to Professor Eugene Volokh’s claim that child-custody conditions on parental speech
are subject to First Amendment constraints—that constitutional rights are simply not relevant
to child-custody determinations, in which the courts are exercising their parens patriae power
rather than their police power. James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self Determination and Children’s
Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ.
L. REV. 79, 125–26 (2012). But see Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody
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approves or disapproves the parent’s decision, courts do not take the
minor’s constitutional rights into account because the parent’s
discretionary actions, taken pursuant to a general grant of legal
authority, cannot easily be imputed to the state.
3. Discerning “Action.” Finally, discerning a constitutional right
of minors to bodily integrity invokes the unique problem of
determining when the state has, in fact, acted. The problem is one of
discerning the baseline against which state action, or intervention, is
to be judged. This problem arises uniquely when one person asserts
rights over another. When the individual rights of competent adults
are involved, the baseline is clear—adults are assumed to have the
liberty to engage in a particular action, and state action occurs
whenever the government interferes with that liberty. Within the
parent-child relationship, however, the baseline assumption is not
always clear. As explained above, courts are likely to identify state
action based on whether they are starting from a parentalist or liberal
view of the family. From the liberal perspective, the state intervenes
when it grants parents authority over minors’ bodies; from the
parentalist perspective, it acts when it intervenes to take away
parental authority.
The baseline problem is apparent in cases involving state laws
228
that grant minors access to contraceptives. In one case, the New
York Appellate Division found a public-school condom-distribution
program to be coercive and violative of parental rights because
“parents [we]re being compelled by State authority to send their
children into an environment where they [were] permitted, even
encouraged, to obtain a contraceptive device, which the parents
229
disfavor as a matter of private belief.” In contrast to the abortion
cases, the court’s baseline assumption appeared to be one of parental
control over minors’ access to contraception. Moreover, the court
discerned governmental coercion from the fact that children were
required by law to attend school where they had access to the

Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 649–56 (2006) (arguing that the First Amendment is
implicated not only when courts issue orders restricting parents’ speech, but also when courts
make custody or visitation decisions based on such speech).
228. See, e.g., Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 148
F.3d 260, 277 (3d Cir. 1998); Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980); Curtis v. Sch.
Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 584–89 (Mass. 1995); Decker v. Carroll Acad., No. 02A01-9709-CV00242, 1999 WL 332705, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 1999).
229. Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d. 259, 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
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program. Yet in other cases involving public-school condomdistribution programs, a number of courts found that there was no
governmental coercion sufficient to raise a constitutional issue with
231
respect to the parents’ family-privacy or free-exercise rights. In
those cases, the courts rejected the argument that compulsory
education constitutes governmental coercion, again raising the issue
of baselines: a school-sponsored condom-distribution program seems
coercive only if compulsory education laws are themselves seen as
232
coercive, rather than as part of the status quo.
A similar confusion also plagues the abortion cases. In Hodgson
233
v. Minnesota, a majority of the Supreme Court upheld a parental234
notification requirement for minors seeking abortions. In dissent,
Justice Marshall noted that the majority assumed the intrusion on the
minors’ right—which here provided the state action forming the basis
of the minors’ constitutional claims—was justified by the need to
235
protect family privacy. But, Marshall insisted, the family-privacy
right was a right “against state interference with family matters,”
whereas the notification requirement effected “governmental
236
intrusion into family interactions.”
Thus, Hodgson raises the
question as to whether the state intrudes into the family when it
permits minors to access abortions without parental notification, or
whether the state intrudes into the family when it forces minors to
notify their parents.

230. Id. at 265–66.
231. See Parents United, 148 F.3d at 277; Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168; Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 584–89
(finding that a school condom-availability program “lack[ed] any degree of coercion or
compulsion in violation of the plaintiffs’ parental liberties, or their familial privacy”); Decker,
1999 WL 332705, at *10.
232. Parents United, 148 F.3d at 276–77 (noting the argument regarding compulsory
education, but essentially ignoring it because the condom program had a parental “opt-out”);
Curtis, 652 N.E.2d at 586–87 (noting the compulsory education argument and the lack of an optout, but rejecting the notion that governmental coercion was therefore present).
233. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
234. Id. at 461 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Hodgson involved a two-parent notification law
that included no bypass mechanism for the minor, but also stated that a bypass mechanism
would be created if the law were held unconstitutional without it. Id. at 426–27. Four Justices
felt that the notification requirement was constitutional, with or without a bypass, and four
Justices felt that it was unconstitutional, with or without a bypass. Only Justice O’Connor
thought the requirement was unconstitutional without the bypass and constitutional with it, so
she provided the deciding vote on both counts.
235. Id. at 483–84 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
236. Id. at 471 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Given the fundamental conflict between the liberal and
parentalist understandings of the family, it is not surprising that
courts cannot decide when the state has acted—that is, whether state
intervention consists in granting or denying parental authority over
children’s bodies. Indeed, numerous commentators have
acknowledged the deep-seated confusion at the heart of the state237
action concept. For example, the notion that nonintervention
equates perfectly with the absence of state action has been roundly
238
criticized. Professor Frances Olsen has argued that the terms
“intervention” and “nonintervention” are incoherent in the family
context, pointing out that political choices are inevitable, even when
the government purports only to enforce the status quo rather than
239
actively intervene. Olsen argues that “[t]he state constantly defines
and redefines the family and adjusts and readjusts family roles” and is
always empowering or disempowering the weaker or stronger
members of a family depending on the rules it chooses to enforce or
240
decline to enforce. Thus, for example, Olsen notes that laws may
penalize those who take children away from the custody of their
parents, “[y]et the state is not accused of intervening in the family
when it forces children to live with their parents or when it prohibits
doctors from treating minors without the parents’ knowledge and
241
approval.”
Olsen’s critique is related to the classical feminist critique of the
public–private distinction, which holds that the state-action
requirement for vindicating rights to equality and bodily integrity
242
systematically undermines women’s claims to the same.
As
Professor Tracy Higgins explains the critique, “the principal threat to
women’s liberty and equality comes not from public power but from
243
private power.” Yet,

237. For a classic example, see Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1302 (1982).
238. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW 42 (1987); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 835 (1985).
239. Olsen, supra note 238, at 835.
240. Id. at 842.
241. Id. at 853.
242. See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 858–59 (2000) (“[A] meaningful right to freedom, bodily integrity, and
security for women must include effective remedies against private violence.”).
243. Id. at 859.
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a state’s systematic failure to respond to abuses of private power will
rarely, if ever, implicate constitutional concerns. Moreover, because
state action is constitutionally relevant while private action is not,
state efforts to intervene in the existing balance of power in the
private sphere are viewed as unconstitutional violations of the rights
of the powerful rather than an effort to balance or regulate
244
conflicting rights.

The distinction between intervention and nonintervention, or action
and inaction, thus appears to be an arbitrary preference for the status
quo—one that privileges those who possess greater physical, financial,
or social power—rather than a meaningful constitutional distinction.
This problem is particularly acute in the case of children because
of their inherent dependency. As the DeShaney Court confirmed, the
Constitution provides only negative rights to government
noninterference, rather than affirmative rights to “certain minimal
245
levels of safety and security.” Yet for children, rights to safety and
protection are at least as important as freedom from governmental
intrusion in their lives. Being in a position of unique dependency,
children rely on the government and others for the meaningful
exercise of their rights, much like prisoners and active-duty members
246
of the military. Although it may be true that adults have only a
bodily integrity right against unwanted, government-imposed physical
intrusion, it is not clear why children’s constitutional right to bodily
integrity should include no more than a mere right against
government intervention or governmental interference with access to
treatment.
B. Theoretical Difficulties in Identifying State Action
The doctrinal difficulties discussed above are rooted in
theoretical problems with the very concept of minors’ bodily integrity
rights, particularly to the extent that the right is understood as a
privacy right against harmful government intrusion. This Part
therefore seeks to explain the doctrinal dilemma of state action. The
theoretical difficulties underlying state action take two forms. First is

244. Id. at 859–60 (citing MACKINNON, supra note 238, at 42).
245. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
246. The idea that children have certain rights by virtue of their dependency is captured by
Professor Joel Feinberg’s concept of “[d]ependency-rights.” Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to
an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND STATE
POWER 124, 125 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
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the “paradox of privacy,” according to which the creation of privacy
rights actually leads to greater, rather than lesser, scrutiny of the
247
rightsholder’s choices. Second is the conundrum of separating state
action from private action in the family context, where the state’s
parens patriae role and duties are often conflated with the roles and
responsibilities of the parents. These difficulties are usefully
elucidated by Foucault’s theory of governmental power, which is
described in detail below. Foucault helpfully demonstrates the
pervasiveness of state power and its implications.
The very existence of a constitutional privacy right seems to
preclude a genuine realm of nonintervention. The moment courts
decide to carve out a domain for family or children’s privacy rights,
they must begin to decide how and when this right may be exercised
and its limits. This analysis generally takes the form of an intrusive
inquiry into the reasoning and decisionmaking processes. The
predominant focus on private reasons for taking action affecting the
child’s body—whether the reasons of the parent or those of the
child—conflicts with the very notion of a privacy right. It intrudes
upon the decision in a way that is diametrically opposed to any
248
meaningful understanding of privacy.
In a related context, Professor Carol Sanger has argued that
meaningful reproductive choice means exercising control not only
over the abortion decision itself, but also “over the method and
249
process by which [the] abortion decision is reached.”
Using
analogies to other protected rights, such as religious freedom, in
which the state is generally viewed as powerless to influence the
individual’s decision process, Sanger explains, “[I]f a choice is
protected because of the profound significance it bears to the
meaning of a person’s life, then the part of life devoted to the
250
choosing—the thinking it through—has got to be protected as well.”
Of course, there are numerous domains in which the state can be
understood to regulate individuals’ private reasons for doing
something: for example, hate-crime laws aggravate penalties if crimes
247. Cf. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 529–30
(2000) (observing the same phenomenon with respect to familial privacy rights).
248. Cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 839, 845 (2005) (defending the constitutional value of the freedom to think and
reason in the absence of governmentally compelled speech or associations).
249. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 358 (2008).
250. Id. at 391.
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are committed for certain reasons But those areas in which state
regulation is based on an individual’s reasons for acting are not areas
that are protected by an individual right to privacy.
In addition, state action is made more complex by the troubling
elision of roles that occurs when the state evaluates private reasons in
this manner. The state-court judge may appear to take on the role of
the parent; indeed, some have been unable to resist actively assuming
251
that role. For example, in one judicial-bypass case, a judge stated,
“‘Let me just say, I’m very concerned about this young lady’s welfare.
252
Like counsel, I’m a mother.’” The functions of discipline and
punishment inherent in many of the ways in which minors’ bodies are
regulated—particularly with respect to judicial-bypass hearings and
corporal punishment—tend to conflate the role of the state and the
role of the parent. Thus, as the quote above indicates, judges ruling
on bypass petitions sometimes use the hearing as an opportunity to
chastise the petitioner, exercising a quasi-parental role. Moreover,
much as the state is entitled to the legitimate use of violence for
punishing wrongdoing, parental discipline is legally legitimate when it
is for the purpose of punishment or otherwise in the interest of
253
shaping the child into a better and more productive citizen.
To make sense of these theoretical difficulties, it is helpful to
draw on the writings of the philosopher and historian Michel
Foucault. One of Foucault’s most persistent concerns is with the
254
meaning and function of power. Foucault’s critical examination of
power in all of its manifestations does not focus specifically on law, on
255
the family, or on liberalism. Nonetheless, Foucault’s theory of
power and its effects may be understood as a challenge to liberalism’s
attempted reconciliation of parental prerogatives and democratic
values with respect to children.

251. Sanger, supra note 131, at 451.
252. Id. (quoting Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So. 2d 542, 561 (Ala. 2001)).
253. Cf. Dailey, supra note 103, at 1005 (discussing the “public” role of families in shaping
future citizens).
254. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 778 (1982)
(observing that he became “quite involved with the question of power” as a means of studying
the subject, which he identified as “the general theme of [his] research”).
255. Note that although Foucault engaged in an extended critique of the economic theory of
“American neo-liberalism” embodied most visibly by the economist Gary Becker, he did not
present his own work as a critique of American liberal political theory per se; rather, I am
inferring this critique from a juxtaposition of Foucault’s work with that of John Rawls (who was
a contemporary of Foucault’s) and others such as Gutmann, who came later. See generally
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS 239–66 (Graham Burchell trans., 2008).
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Foucault contends that in modern society, social power is not
simply a thing wielded by the state; it is itself an effect that may be
manifested in many different forms, including in private
256
Thus, according to Foucault, state power is
relationships.
257
everywhere.
Unlike medieval society, in which power was
concentrated in the sovereign, modern society manifests social power
through multiple centers, particularly through the discourse that
258
organizes, categorizes, and explains our experiences. In The History
of Sexuality, for example, Foucault argues that the Victorian Era,
supposedly characterized by a prudish disdain for speaking about
sexuality, was actually an era in which particular kinds of discourse
about sex—medical, psychological, moral, and so on—proliferated as
259
a way of managing and controlling sex and sexuality.
The case law that creates and delimits children’s privacy rights
results in a similar proliferation of discourse. Although superficially
aimed at liberating children and granting them autonomy over their
bodies, this case law in fact operates as a means to further manage
and control both children’s choices and those of their parents. This
fact is evidenced by the judicial preoccupation with children’s and
260
parents’ reasoning. In addition, every recognition of a right is at the
same time an invitation for state intervention, as courts themselves
must now determine the scope of the right. For example, although
appearing to grant minors autonomy in reproductive decisionmaking,
the minor abortion cases in fact simply subject them to judicial, rather
than parental control.
Thus, according to Foucault, power in modern society is both
expansive and diffuse: “Nobody knows this knowledge; no one wields
261
this power.” Though power is sometimes coercive in form, acting
directly on individuals’ bodies, it also functions “by normalization,
not by punishment but by control, [by] methods that are employed on
256. MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 93–94 (Robert Hurley trans.,
1988).
257. Id. at 93.
258. Id. at 100–02.
259. See id. at 33–34 (“Sex was driven out of hiding and constrained to lead a discursive
existence.”).
260. See, e.g., Baird v. Attorney Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 292–93 (Mass. 1977) (stating that a
minor’s parents may legally withhold consent to an abortion for some reasons but not others);
Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (carefully evaluating the moral soundness
of the parents’ reasons for authorizing kidney donation by a minor child).
261. Ian Hacking, The Archaeology of Foucault, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER 27, 28
(David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986).
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all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.”
Foucault contends that scientific discourse about sex creates a domain
of the normal, appropriate, and average that is demarcated from the
pathological, and that this demarcation is both an instance of and an
263
opportunity for the exercise of power.
As this Article demonstrates, legal discourse is similarly
preoccupied with individual decisions and how they compare to
264
community norms. In Marriage of Boldt, discussed above, the court
explicitly referenced social norms in upholding a parent’s decision to
265
circumcise his twelve-year-old son for religious reasons. Similarly,
state courts consider parents’ reasons for inflicting physical pain on
their children when deciding whether to label the conduct as abuse or
as a legitimate form of discipline. The conduct, of course, is also
reviewed for “excessiveness” and judged by other similarly
amorphous norms that call for decisionmakers to apply the judges’
266
own, or society’s, sense of what is normal and acceptable conduct.
The concept of legitimate discipline, in particular, links the case law
267
on children’s bodily integrity to Foucault’s work on social power.
Moreover, though social power is often exercised in private
settings, Foucault conceptualizes that power as nonetheless tied to the
268
state. The private power is “governmentalized” because of the way
its exercise is influenced by state-created norms and rules:
It is certain that in contemporary societies the state is not simply one
of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power—even if it
is the most important—but that in a certain way all other forms of
power relation must refer to it. But this is not because they are
derived from it; it is rather because power relations have come more

262. FOUCAULT, supra note 256, at 89. Dean Martha Minow has stated, “Power is at its
peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious
challenges from discussion or even imagination.” Martha Minow, The Supreme Court: 1986
Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 68 (1987). I am grateful to
Professor Susan Frelich Appleton for bringing this quote to my attention.
263. FOUCAULT, supra note 256, at 33–34.
264. See supra notes 138 and 148 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
267. David Couzens Hoy, Introduction to FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER, supra note
261, at 1, 13. Social power is closely linked to the concept of “discipline” in two senses. First, the
term “discipline” implies exercising control, and thus power, in the way a parent or a state
disciplines individuals. Second, social power is bound up with academic disciplines, in that
disciplines are the mechanisms by which knowledge is acquired and organized. Id.
268. Foucault, supra note 254, at 793.
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and more under state control . . . . [O]ne could say that power
relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say,
elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the
269
auspices of, state institutions.

Examples of this decentralized state power include obvious tentacles
of the state such as prisons, schools, the public-welfare system, and
public-health programs, as well as less obvious agents of sovereign
power like private charities and the medical-scientific establishment,
270
as well as the family itself. Foucault therefore envisions state power
as permeating and shaping all aspects of human experience; it is
271
nearly (but not entirely) inescapable. All of these institutions,
though manifesting state power, operate to a large degree
independently of any centralized authority.
Furthermore, although the quintessential image of sovereign
power may be that of the government acting upon individuals’
bodies—for example, by arresting or imprisoning them—the real
object of the modern disciplining state, according to Foucault, is
272
control over individuals’ minds and souls. The state disciplines in
many instances through internalized norms and standards, rather than
through brute force. Moreover, one of the primary modes through
which power performs these operations is a linguistic one—namely
273
“discourse.” “[I]t is in discourse that power and knowledge are
joined together. . . . Discourse transmits and produces power; it
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile
274
and makes it possible to thwart it.” Legal discourse is one such

269. Id.
270. See, e.g., id. at 784 (referring to “pastoral power” exerted by public arms such as the
police as well as “private ventures, welfare societies, benefactors, and generally by
philanthropists” in addition to “the family” and “complex structures such as medicine”).
271. Indeed, some commentators criticize Foucault for “describ[ing] power as so pervasive
and irresistible as to make resistance seem futile”; Professor David Hoy suggests, however, that
Foucault believed modern society had not yet been completely “normalized,” and that he wrote
precisely in the hope of staving off such complete normalization. Hoy, supra note 267, at 13–14.
272. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 10–11
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (describing a “‘non-corporal’ penalty” in which “[t]he body . . .
serves as an instrument or intermediary”); id. at 17 (noting that in the modern penal system,
“the ‘crimes’ and ‘offences’ on which judgement [sic] is passed are juridical objects defined by
the code, but judgement [sic] is also passed on the passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities,
maladjustments, effects of environment or heredity”).
273. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 256, at 100–01.
274. Id.
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discourse; other normalizing discourses include those practiced in the
medical, scientific, psychological, and public-health disciplines.
Foucault’s emphasis on normalization and on controlling minds
rather than bodies helps to explain the “paradox of privacy,” by
which a proliferation of privacy rights can coexist with ever-increasing
state intrusion in individuals’ decisionmaking processes. The ultimate
aim and inevitable result of state power is to control the mental
processes—the individual’s reasoning—rather than the underlying
conduct. The existence of a privacy right therefore functions as a
welcome invitation for courts to scrutinize those processes, while
simultaneously protecting certain private conduct from state
regulation.
Importantly, however, disciplinary power is often “positive” in
the sense that its goal is not to repress, but to improve and extend the
lives of individuals, to make them productive citizens. Foucault claims
that such regulation in the interest of societal good and social mores is
simply a newer form of power, but still exercised, as always, over
275
human bodies. Foucault describes public-health regulation and
related surveillance and management of health data as a form of
“biopower”—power that is exercised on the level of the population as
276
a whole and in the interests of society as a whole.
Indeed, according to Foucault, it is precisely in the regulation of
the body that the disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms tend to
277
overlap. Foucault describes how “[c]irculat[ing] between the two”
poles of individual discipline and population-level biopolitics “is the
278
norm.” Social norms become tools of both individual discipline and
279
regularization of the population.
To the extent the values imposed by liberalism create a certain
harmony of ideals between the family and the broader democratic
society, that harmony is a reflection of the way in which modern state
power infiltrates all dimensions of human life, or in Foucault’s words,
“cover[s] the whole surface that lies between the organic and the
280
biological, between body and population.” Moreover, where minors
275. MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE
FRANCE, 1975–76, at 242 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans.,
1977).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 250–51.
278. Id. at 253.
279. Id.
280. Id.
DE
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have been granted autonomy rights by courts to serve particular
public-health goals, those rights may also be understood as an
instance of this phenomenon.
One example of how social norms can both shape and construct
the understanding of children’s bodies and bodily integrity, revealing
an exercise of power at the intersection of medical, familial, and
281
social discourses, is in the context of defining child abuse.
Documenting the fluctuation of the concept of child abuse over time,
philosopher and historian of science Ian Hacking observes that child
282
abuse is a “normalizing concept.” Child abuse is defined and
understood “in a framework of normalcy and pathology,” but at the
283
same time, the nature of the “normal” is not fixed. Rather, the
normal is both a descriptive and prescriptive concept—“what is
284
unusual becomes abnormal, and what is abnormal becomes wrong.”
Hacking uses the example of a commentator who suggests that it is
abusive to allow children to sleep with their parents past the stage of
285
infancy. Hacking notes that this practice was once commonplace
and only subsided when a large number of families could afford
homes large enough that children could have separate rooms from
286
their parents. The concept of child abuse thus invokes a norm at the
intersection of the individual and the broader society: what is
“normal” in the sense of being common within a society becomes
“normal” in the sense of appropriate and acceptable for the
287
individual. This normalizing process is the modern manifestation of
social power.
The Foucauldian perspective suggests that both the elision of
roles and the attention to private reasoning are functions of the
omnipresence of state power in modern society, and they are united

281. Hacking, supra note 163, at 285–88.
282. Id. at 286.
283. Id. at 287.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. The practice of cosleeping has become more common again, often due to the
parents’ parenting philosophy or the simple need to get some sleep. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil
Jr., More Infants Are Sleeping with Their Parents, and a Debate Ensues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2011, at A9 (noting that the percent of infants who shared beds with parents more than doubled
from 1993 to 2000).
287. The normalizing force of defining abuse provides one explanation for why those who
are already marginal within society—racially, socioeconomically, and so on—may be more
likely to be labeled as abusers. See generally Bridges, supra note 96, at 117 (arguing that indigent
women and families lack the presumption of privacy and are more subject to “public” scrutiny).
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by the concept of “discipline.” The law’s focus on private deliberation
and reasoning is entirely expected if one understands the object of
social power to be the “soul” rather than the body and the means by
which that power is exercised to be the social norm. Indeed, Foucault
claims that social norms operate to unite the disciplinary and the
regulatory power—acting both at the level of the individual, who
288
internalizes the norms, and the state, which enforces them.
As exemplified by the term parens patriae, the concept of
discipline itself unites parent and state in the goal of protecting
children but also the goal of molding them into model citizens. The
term parens patriae literally translates as “parent of his or her
country,” but it means that the state acts as parent in certain
289
situations. The identification of the parent with the state suggests
that state power permeates the family as the family itself becomes
governmentalized. Through the law’s management of children’s
bodies within the family, family relations are studied, surveilled, and
normalized. Some parents’ punishment is deemed legitimate, and
others’ is not; some minors’ reasons for avoiding childbirth are strong
enough, whereas others are not. Children’s healthcare is regulated in
the interest of the greater good in that they receive some autonomy
rights only to the extent that this autonomy serves the interests of
public health—for example, through exceptions to parental-consent
requirements for minors seeking access to testing and treatment for
290
sexually transmitted diseases.
Moreover, the elision of parental and governmental roles,
brought about in part by the state’s regulation of the reasoning
behind private decisionmaking with respect to children’s bodies,
demonstrates the way in which state power permeates the family,
imposing its power to normalize and standardize. The state acts as
parent in exercising its parens patriae power. The metaphor becomes
even more concrete when a judge steps into the parent’s role in a
judicial-bypass hearing, or when the court stands in for community
standards in examining the parents’ motivation for seeking to

288. FOUCAULT, supra note 275, at 253.
289. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
290. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott & Clare Huntington, Children’s Health in a Legal Framework
2 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-418),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2503685 (arguing that “the state
intervenes to promote children’s health only in response to compelling social welfare needs such
as reducing teenage pregnancy, juvenile crime, and communicable diseases,” or in response to
abusive parents).
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authorize an organ donation from one sibling to another. Yet the
parent also stands in for the state, disciplining the child in the interest
of creating better citizens—and only when the discipline is for reasons
the state considers legitimate. The state acts, in a sense, as a
“‘civilizing mechanism[] . . . , reminding people subjectively of the
292
293
locus of power’” and “satisfy[ing] the needs of social order.” At
the same time, “relations of power” permeate the parent-child
relationship, and it seems arbitrary to attribute any one exercise of
294
power to the state.
Foucault’s theory suggests a reason why the legal discourse of
privacy within the family, in conjunction with the emergence of the
legal discourse of children’s rights, likely only increases the power of
the state rather than creating a true zone of privacy or empowerment
for minors. Once both children and parents are understood as rightsholders, opportunities for adjudication of their respective rights
295
proliferate. Eventually, the law occupies all available space within
the parent-child relationship, as every decision with respect to
children’s bodies carries possible implications for the minor’s right to
bodily integrity. Moreover, the diffuse but omnipresent role of the
state—which sets the background rules of parental custody and
control over medical decisionmaking—creates not just legal but also
potentially constitutional implications for every such choice by parent
or child.
IV. REIMAGINING STATE ACTION AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
The doctrinal and theoretical incoherence of state action raises
unique problems for the partially constitutionalized right of children
to bodily integrity. The failure of courts to recognize and address
these problems directly accounts for their failure to recognize a
consistent and meaningful right of minors to bodily integrity. This
Section therefore suggests a partial way out of the state-action
problem by means of a more careful understanding of state power.

291. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text.
292. Sanger, supra note 131, at 470 (quoting NATALIE SEMON DAVIS, FICTION IN THE
ARCHIVE: PARDON TALES & THEIR TELLERS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (1987)).
293. Id. at 471.
294. Foucault, supra note 254, at 793.
295. The common law itself fits within Foucault’s understanding of diffuse and decentralized
state power that acts within private as well as public domains.
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The first step in reimagining children’s constitutional right to
bodily integrity is to consistently recognize the right across all
doctrinal areas, including reproductive healthcare, end-of-life care,
routine medical decisionmaking, nontherapeutic interventions, and
corporal punishment. All of these domains implicate the bodily
integrity right. So long as state action can be identified, there is no
reason for applying constitutional doctrine to one kind of dispute but
not the others.
The second step is to establish the content of the constitutional
right to bodily integrity for children. As argued above, the content of
that right is implicit in both the common-law recognition of the state’s
authority to intervene in the family on behalf of children and in the
minor abortion cases. For younger minors, the right takes the form of
a right to bodily security or protection—broadly, a right to have their
best interests protected by the state against parents who fail to do so.
For older, mature minors, the right becomes primarily an autonomy
right to make their own decisions about their bodies when, and to the
extent that, they are capable of doing so.
Foucault’s theory of power—which appears to be particularly
applicable in the context of children’s right to bodily integrity—
further suggests the arbitrariness of the state-action line drawn by
cases such as DeShaney. It demonstrates that state power permeates
and structures the family relationship. The third step in reconceiving
children’s right to bodily integrity is thus to consider the state as
acting in some sense whenever parents act on their children’s bodies
without danger of legal sanction. If the state is acting as a parent, and
the parent is acting as agent of the state, then it is not particularly
meaningful to consider some violations as purely private and others
as perpetrated by public actors. Under this new understanding of
state action, in contrast to existing doctrine, every parental violation
of a child’s bodily integrity would become a potential constitutional
violation, chargeable to the state. The problems of identifying state
actors and state action would thus fall away in most cases.
Yet, the problems with this scenario are obvious. Many teenagers
would, no doubt, be inclined to make a federal case—literally!—out
of every prohibited tattoo, every detention by grounding, every
rhinoplasty denied. Though in some sense it is accurate that a parent
is drawing on the authority of the state when she controls her child’s
body in these ways, there is a danger that the scope of judicial
intervention in family disputes would become overwhelming and
ultimately harmful, both to families and to the courts.
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At the same time, it may be possible to retain Foucault’s
understanding of state power while avoiding the problem of courts
micromanaging family decisionmaking. This could be accomplished
by providing a degree of substantive parental discretion or privacy
within the family. Constitutional doctrine could and should recognize
that parental decisions about children’s bodies contain a
constitutional dimension, without radically changing the existing legal
rules and entitlements, by applying a deferential understanding of
children’s best interests. The doctrine can accommodate the notion
that parents will generally act in their children’s best interests and the
state should intervene only when there is serious reason to doubt that
this is the case. Parents would thus still be granted a realm of
discretion to make most medical and nonmedical decisions for
younger minors, whereas older minors would be granted greater
power under the “autonomy” prong of the bodily integrity right. In
other words, the best-interests requirement would be applied
deferentially, such that judges could not second-guess reasonable
decisions of fit parents.
Moreover, given that parents still hold the purse strings in most
families, they would maintain a significant degree of de facto control
over many decisions about nonmedically indicated interventions.
Constitutional law neither can nor should alter this aspect of the
status quo. The expense and other difficulties of minors’ bringing suit
therefore likely means that they would be unlikely to do so except in
the most serious cases. Minors would continue to have access to
courts to vindicate their own interests in the most limited of
circumstances, where a guardian ad litem or other entity (such as a
hospital seeking to provide medical care) is in a position to assert the
minor’s interests.
Finally, despite the elision of parental and governmental roles, it
would require too radical a revision of constitutional law to designate
every person who acts pursuant to a state grant of authority—such as
296
a parent—a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The need
to identify a state actor according to conventional legal standards
would thus remain in § 1983 lawsuits to vindicate minors’
constitutional right to bodily integrity. Long-standing jurisprudence
indicates that even if state action is present (here, based on the

296. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982)
(distinguishing between the requirements of state action under § 1983 and of an action
performed by a defendant acting “under color of state law”).
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underlying common-law entitlements giving parents authority over
their children’s decisions), a private individual cannot be sued unless
297
he can be said to be acting under color of state law. If a mature
minor wishes to vindicate her constitutional right to make her own
medical decisions, for example, she could not bring suit under § 1983
unless she could identify a state actor who played a role in preventing
her from doing so. In Joshua DeShaney’s case, the social workers’
decision to return him to the home would be sufficient, because they
are state actors and state action would be identified in the social
298
workers’ decision to leave him in the custody of his abusive father.
In most cases, however, parents would be considered private actors
and therefore § 1983 would not apply.
This limitation on independent lawsuits to vindicate minors’
constitutional bodily integrity right would significantly reduce the
amount of judicial intervention that would result from reformulating
state-action doctrine to recognize the pervasiveness of state power.
But at the same time, the domain of parental discretion would begin
to have meaningful substantive limits, grounded in minors’
constitutional right. Though not radically changing the current
substantive entitlements, the constitutionalization of this domain
would not be entirely empty. It would have several significant effects
for minors seeking to vindicate a right to bodily integrity.
First and foremost, the mature-minor and best-interest doctrines,
derived from the common law but constitutionalized in the case of
minors seeking abortions, would become constitutional standards
across the board because they track closely the essential meaning of
the bodily integrity right for minors. Though these standards already
apply to minors seeking to exercise their right to access abortions,
they would also apply to minors in other medical contexts, such as
those facing decisions about end-of-life care. In contrast to the status
quo, minors could not be denied medical care that was in their best
interests, and mature minors would have a right to make their own
299
medical decisions, even in those states that lack mature-minor rules.
Currently, minors’ rights in these situations are notably unclear and
vary from state to state. Therefore, constitutionalizing the mature297. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150–52 (1970) (noting that “our
cases make clear” that the plaintiff was required to establish that the defendant was acting
under the color of law to prevail under her § 1983 claim).
298. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1989).
299. The standards for maturity and best interests are, of course, somewhat amorphous, but
an attempt to define and clarify them is beyond the scope of this Article.
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minor and best-interests standards across the board would help
regularize the landscape and create greater predictability and
protection for the minors themselves.
Second, in contrast to the current doctrine, minors in abusive
homes would have a constitutional cause of action for the
government’s failure to protect them under this revised
understanding of state action. Of course, the ability of a minor to sue
the government for violation of his right to bodily integrity would be
subject to limitations, both in terms of a requirement that the
intrusion be severe enough to rise to a constitutionally cognizable
level, and in terms of the requirements that must be met for
municipal liability to attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as a showing
of “deliberate indifference” on the part of a policymaker or a
300
municipal pattern and practice of constitutional violations. But the
minor would not be deprived of that right by a specious and arbitrary
state-action requirement. If the minor were able to state a
constitutional claim by identifying a state actor, such as a social
worker or a police officer who returned her to an abusive home, that
individual actor would be liable to the minor in a suit for damages,
barring the assertion of immunities. Even if the individual state actor
were immune from damages claims, the minor could seek an
injunction to prevent her return to the home.
In addition, if a minor were otherwise able to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court—through an action for an injunction to
prevent a battery, for example, or through any other relevant cause of
action under state law—she would be entitled to have constitutional
bodily integrity norms applied in her case. If the alleged battery, such
as corporal punishment or a medically unnecessary surgery, was
found not to be in the minor’s best interests, it could not be forced
upon her.
Because the constitutional norms would have to apply in legal
disputes between private parties, minors would be entitled to
consideration of their right to bodily integrity when hospitals seek
court orders to proceed with medical treatment in the face of parental
refusals, for example. In medical-treatment disputes, this would
require a consideration of whether the treatment is in a younger

300. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (noting that “a showing of
simple or even heightened negligence” would not suffice); Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (acknowledging that local government customs are subject to scrutiny
under § 1983).
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minor’s best interests, granting due deference to parental judgment.
Such a requirement may or may not align with the current law applied
301
in such disputes, given the variation in state law. If the minor is
older, courts will have to determine whether he is mature and wellinformed enough to make the decision on his own, and if so, there
will be no warrant for deferring to parents’ wishes. Whether this
process aligns with current substantive legal standards or not, it would
be a departure from existing case law in which minors’ constitutional
bodily integrity right is rarely considered. Moreover, merely invoking
constitutional law rather than state statutory or common law would
force courts to try to conform their rulings to one another and would
thereby create a degree of uniformity.
When minors seek access to nontherapeutic or nonmedical
interventions, practical concerns regarding the ability to pay for the
procedure may well prevent cases from getting to court in the first
place. But for those minors who are old enough to have access to
funds, a court would be required to allow tattooing or piercing, for
example, irrespective of state law, so long as the minor can
demonstrate her maturity. Though it is hard to imagine a scenario in
which a minor could identify a source of funds but is not mature
enough to make her own decisions, courts could also consider certain
interventions to be in the minors’ best interests. For example, a minor
who can get vaccinated free of charge may argue it is in her best
interests to do so, even if her parents object. A physician or hospital
may be in a position to raise such a claim. Similarly, one who is in a
position to raise the rights of a newborn may object on his behalf to
genital normalization surgery.
Admittedly, the possibility of physicians or others raising the
rights of minors might put some pressure on the doctrine of thirdparty standing, which is relatively limited. Courts might find
themselves being forced to decide who is close enough to a minor to
assert that minor’s rights as against the minor’s own parents. Yet at
the same time, it should be expected that such lawsuits would be
unusual, because of the cost and practical difficulties involved, as well
as the deferential standard that would be applied in many cases.
Instead, the constitutionalization of the children’s bodily integrity
right, while making a concrete difference for some minors, would
perhaps primarily serve an expressive function for many other
minors. It would alert adults, along with state-court judges, to the fact
301. See supra Part I.B.2 and text accompanying notes 62–70.
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that minors have constitutional rights that must be considered along
with the interests of the parents and the state.
CONCLUSION
The legal doctrine and system of regulation surrounding
children’s bodies are profoundly fragmented. Similar questions arise
about the extent of parental control over children’s bodies in
numerous contexts—such as corporal punishment, medical
decisionmaking, and reproductive rights—and courts generally apply
substantively similar standards in analyzing these questions. Yet,
children’s constitutional right to bodily integrity has not been
consistently recognized across those doctrinal areas, and it has been
only partially constitutionalized.
This Article argues that the reason for this fragmentation lies in
the unique difficulty of identifying state action in cases involving
children’s right to bodily integrity. This difficulty is partly a doctrinal
one that is attributable to three separate factors. First, state action is
difficult to identify when private actors, rather than state actors, are
primarily responsible for the infringement of the minor’s bodily
integrity—even though the infringement is directly enabled by state
laws delegating authority over children to parents. Second, and
relatedly, it is difficult to impute infringements on minors’ bodily
integrity right to the state when the parents’ actions are taken
pursuant to facially neutral rules granting broad parental discretion,
such as those authorizing parents to consent to medical treatment for
their minor children, rather than rules authorizing specific
interventions, such as those permitting sterilization of mentally
incompetent minors or requiring parental consent for an abortion.
Third, the fundamental, unresolved tension between the liberal and
parentalist perspectives in the case law means that courts have
difficulty identifying whether the state has actually intervened in the
family—that is, whether state intervention consists of empowering
parents or of empowering children. Moreover, these doctrinal
difficulties reflect the tendency of state power to permeate every
aspect of family life through a discourse that relentlessly seeks to
examine the most private of domains. Ostensibly private settings such
as the family are “governmentalized” through the application of legal
and social norms, which threaten to turn the family into yet another
tentacle of the state. Paradoxically, the recognition of privacy rights
within the family only magnifies this tendency, as it invites judicial
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intervention into, and examination of, parents’ and children’s
decisionmaking processes.
Recognizing children’s constitutional right to bodily integrity in
each domain where the state plays a role in delegating authority over
children’s bodies would clear the way for a more robust and coherent
doctrine. Indeed, the fundamental substantive principles of children’s
bodily integrity right have already been established in both
constitutional and common-law cases—that is, older, mature minors
are entitled to make decisions autonomously and younger, immature
minors are entitled to have the state safeguard their best interests.
In addition, a broader understanding of state action in the
context of children’s rights is necessary. Because state power already
determines the scope of parental authority over children, state action
is present whenever a parent violates a child’s bodily integrity
pursuant to a delegation of authority from the state. Although
parents should still be presumed to be acting in their children’s best
interests, their decisions should not be entirely immune from judicial
consideration. Minors should be able to challenge the
constitutionality of those parental decisions if they can overcome the
practical and procedural hurdles to achieving judicial consideration of
their constitutional claims.
Admittedly, this proposed revision of constitutional doctrine still
relies upon murky concepts—such as maturity and best interests—
that do not always admit of clear, bright-line rules. Moreover, the
scope of substantive discretion to be afforded to parents under this
proposed framework requires further judicial specification. However,
despite leaving some questions unanswered, this Article suggests a
way in which the children’s constitutional bodily integrity right may
be recognized and respected within the family without
constitutionalizing every aspect of family life.

